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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Coordinating Rooks and Bishops: An Institutional History of  
 
the Joint Army and Navy Board, 1903 – 1919.   
 
(August 2004) 
 
Jason Robert Godin, B.A., University of Wisconsin – Madison 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James C. Bradford 
 
 
 This thesis examines the formative years of the Joint 
Army and Navy Board, 1903 to 1919.  It serves as an 
institutional history, focusing on the function of the 
interservice coordination body.  The Joint Board is 
examined within the context of formulating American 
military strategy and U.S. diplomatic affairs from its 
creation in July 1903 to its reconstitution in 1919.   
 At present no comprehensive historical study exists 
focusing on the Joint Board.  Currently, interservice 
cooperation and coordination during this period receive no 
more than peripheral analysis in war plan studies.  Thus, 
this work begins the first comprehensive history of the 
precursor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
 This thesis analyzes the origins and creation of the 
Joint Board, the Board’s basic duties and responsibilities, 
and Joint Board actions as they impacted U.S. diplomacy and 
 iv
military strategy concerning the homeland and coast 
defense, the Caribbean and Cuba, the Panama Canal, as well 
as the Pacific and the Philippines.  Within this 
geographical framework, this thesis explores the relation 
of the Joint Board to the Navy General Board and Army 
General Staff, the cooperation of the U.S. Army and U.S. 
Navy between the Spanish-American War and World War I, the 
impact of Joint Board actions on American civil-military 
relations, and the efficacy of interservice cooperation.    
This thesis is based largely on unpublished as well as 
published primary sources, including the records of the 
Joint Board, Navy General Board records, Army War College 
Division records, and members’ personal papers housed at 
the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.  In addition, 
secondary sources are used to place the Joint Board within 
the larger contextual framework of interservice 
cooperation, U.S. civil-military relations, and American 
military history during the early twentieth century.    
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Even in the early twenty-first century, complete 
cooperation and coordination between American military 
planners remains an unachieved goal.  The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS), a formal consultative body accepted as the 
solution for integrating military services, has undergone 
significant structural revisions since its permanent 
establishment in 1947.  The most recent reform – the 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Act - consolidated all military advising 
to the President solely with the JCS Chairman, suggesting 
service loyalties and ad hoc innovations still plague the 
institution.1  Yet such functional issues are nothing new 
in American military history.   
Civilian policymakers at the turn of the twentieth 
century created a consultative body mandated specifically 
to alleviate interservice acrimony encountered during the 
1898 Spanish-American War.  From its creation in July 1903 
until its reconstitution in 1919, the Joint Army and Navy 
Board – more commonly called the Joint Board by its  
____________ 
Style and format follow the Journal of Military History. 
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contemporaries – was the first formal attempt in American 
history to institutionalize cooperation and coordination 
between the military services.  Like the JCS officers that 
followed them, members of the Joint Board formulated 
strategic recommendations for their civilian superiors 
through a process characterized by service parochialism and 
personal networking.   
While the Board succeeded insofar as a forum that 
brought service military heads together consistently, the 
Joint Board was unable to establish a standard operating 
procedure for formulating military strategy.  The early 
interservice consultative body dealt only with subjects 
sent to it by civilian policymaking authorities in the War 
or Navy Departments.  Civilian policymakers looked for 
military strategy recommendations outside the Joint Board, 
often relying upon high-ranking individual officers and the 
recommendations of boards within their own services.    
The intent of the author is to provide the first 
comprehensive institutional history of the Joint Board, 
specifically addressing the functional elements of the 
early interservice coordinating body.  Using National 
Archives records of the Joint Board, Navy General Board, 
and Army War College Division, as well as the members’ 
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personal papers housed at the Library of Congress in 
Washington, D.C., this work describes the origins and 
creation of the Joint Board, and analyzes the Board’s basic 
duties and responsibilities as outlined by its civilian 
superiors.  Secondary sources are also used to place the 
Joint Board and its decisions within a larger historical 
context of U.S. diplomatic history, previous American 
interservice cooperation, U.S. civil-military relations, 
and American military history beginning in the early 
twentieth century.         
Following a brief overview of traditions in 
interservice relations during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, special attention is then paid to 
homeland and coast defense, the Caribbean and Cuba, the 
Panama Canal, and finally the Pacific and the Philippines.  
Within such a geographical framework, it is clear that 
army-navy relations were predominantly harmonious when it 
came to the minutiae of military affairs.  Joint Board 
members routinely reached consensus on matters dealing with 
the location of wireless telegraphy lines, the need for 
military preparedness, and military-led governments of U.S. 
insular possessions.   
4 
Joint Board recommendations concerning broad strategic 
matters, however, proved far more contentious and affirmed 
how narrow service interests and informal networking 
determined American military strategy.  An analysis of 
meeting minutes and private correspondence reveals that the 
Army and Navy leaders disagreed vehemently over where to 
place specific insular naval stations, as well as which 
service should head their military governments at these 
locations.  Individual admirals and generals instead used 
the Joint Board as a forum for advocating their own 
opinions, as well as policies already recommended by the 
consultative bodies within their own services.  Chapters V 
(Defending and Managing the Isthmian Pass: The Panama 
Canal) and VI (“Broken Down Old Men:” The Pacific and 
Philippines) make these final points especially clear.   
While historical attention has been given to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, at present no comprehensive study exists 
focusing exclusively on the Joint Board.2  Currently, 
interservice cooperation and coordination during this 
period receive no more than peripheral analysis in war plan 
studies.  The first historian to make any mention of the 
Joint Board was diplomatic historian Fred Greene in his 
January 1961 American Historical Review article “The 
5 
Military View of American National Policy, 1904-1940.”  
Drawing from official Joint Board records and personal 
papers, Greene concluded that military planners developed 
war plans “in accordance with the position of the United 
States as they understood it.”3  Individual service 
perceptions of American foreign policy – rather than a 
unified army-navy opinion – shaped early twentieth-century 
American military strategy.  Greene, however, barely 
mentioned the Joint Board within the article text itself, 
and specific references to the Board were confined to the 
footnotes.   
A year later, military historian Louis Morton – most 
noted for his scholarship on World War II in the Green Book 
series – contributed a book chapter in 1962 on cooperation 
between civilian and military authorities.  In Total War 
and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military, 
Morton briefly traced the formative years of the Joint 
Board, a body which he termed the “lineal ancestor of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.”4 According to Morton, the 
coordination process “between the political and military 
elements involved in the formation of national policy” 
evolved slowly over time.  The creation of the Joint Board 
came only after the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy first 
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established consultative bodies within their own services.  
During the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, the Joint 
Board “had the confidence of the President and enjoyed a 
large measure of prestige.”  Yet by April 1914 and the 
Woodrow Wilson presidency, the Board had become 
“unimportant.”  Due to the broad scope of the essay, Morton 
did not provide extensive analysis into why the Joint Board 
experienced such a dramatic decline in its influence.5   
Morton contributed an important analysis on the Joint 
Board’s procedures.  He argued the Board was hampered by 
bureaucratic inertia over who was charged with deciding 
military strategy within the services, as well as how 
military policy was decided between the services. Civilian 
authorities clearly had an impact on the degree of 
coordination between the services. The index of Joint Board 
success or failure required an understanding of how much 
the civilian President as commander-in-chief acted upon the 
recommendations provided by the interservice body.  Yet, 
like Greene, Morton did not fully explore in detail the 
impact the Joint Board had on the relationship between 
military officers and their civilian superiors, nor the 
specific factors used in calculating military strategy.                
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The question of why Joint Board decisions took the 
form they did was first addressed by Richard D. Challener.  
In his 1973 study titled Admirals, Generals, and American 
Foreign Policy, 1898 – 1914, Challener argued that American 
military planning lacked proper political guidance prior to 
World War I.  Consequently, U.S. Army and U.S. Navy 
officers never understood clearly the political challenges 
facing their civilian superiors.  According to Challener, 
however, the military planners could not be faulted solely 
for the absence of such political wisdom.  During this time 
civilian policymakers sought to subordinate military 
officers, educating them to function apolitically.  The 
failure of war plans to adequately reflect political 
realities thus rested largely with civilian superiors.  As 
a result of such political isolation, personalities and 
informal personal networking among military officers 
prevailed as the dominant channel of accessing policy 
information.6           
Challener and his conclusions on war planning remained 
unchallenged for roughly a quarter century until war plan 
studies began to place the onus primarily on military 
officers for the nature of war planning.  Steven T. Ross 
argues in his 2002 work, American War Plans, 1890 – 1939, 
8 
that the organizational changes following the 1898 Spanish–
American War proved ineffective primarily because of 
“unrealistic political assumptions.” In analyzing the Joint 
Board’s color-coded contingency plans, Ross concluded there 
was a failure “to take into account the actual national 
policies [of the United States] and those of designated 
foes.”  Joint Board plans were “often written in a 
political vacuum” because officers failed to comprehend the 
diplomatic situation facing their superiors.7
Like Ross, Edward S. Miller also highlighted the 
military aspect of interservice planning.  Yet in his 1991 
study on War Plan Orange, which remains the most 
comprehensive study of any war plan to date, he paid 
special attention to the system used in making American 
military strategy.  Miller remarked that when it came to 
American war planning procedures in general         
a laissez-faire attitude prevailed; competing ideas 
were encouraged and dissent was tolerated.  Decisions 
were hammered out in clashes between army and navy, 
between rival naval staffs, and between individuals of 
aggressive or cautious bent.  Informal practices were 
as important as bureaucratic structure.8
 
Unlike his predecessors, Miller recognized the significance 
of the two service consultative bodies, the Army General 
Staff and Navy General Board, in American war planning.  He 
9 
argues that in addition to the sharp debates among the two 
service staffs, the characteristics of individual officers 
molded military policies - and the policy processes that 
went into making them - just as much as the Joint Board.  
Miller claimed there was a distinct “American Way of 
Planning” that stressed the importance of out-of-meeting 
interactions and the interservice alliances forged by those 
officers.9    
In June 1955 historian Ernest R. May observed  
military forces are the rooks and bishops behind the 
knights and pawns of diplomacy; although the rooks and 
bishops move less frequently, their role in the game 
is no less decisive.  Before the executors of foreign 
policy can decide what the nation ought to do, they 
must learn from political and military experts what 
the nation is able to do.  They must lay objectives 
alongside capabilities. . .10
 
The Joint Board – both in theory and practice – reflected 
May’s chessboard metaphor.  Civilian “knights and pawns of 
diplomacy” demanded that professional military officers not 
only plan, but also recommended the projection of American 
military might as well.  Yet when it ultimately came to 
coordinating these military “rooks and bishops,” civilian 
authorities provided little or no political guidance.  
Military officers in both services were left to determine 
strategy based largely on their own individual perceptions 
10 
and the recommendations of their own services’ consultative 
bodies.  Ironically, when it came to defining and executing 
an interservice strategy between the Spanish-American War 
and World War I, American military strategies reflected a 
return to the traditional service loyalties and the ad hoc 
innovations practiced of the past.  To fully understand 
such irony, one must first turn to the traditions of 
interservice relations in the United States prior to 1903. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1 Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American 
Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), 184-5; Amy B. Zegart, 
Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 109-62.      
 
2 The current historiography available on the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) is both rich and extensive.  The best source 
on the JCS and its impact on national policy are found in 
the History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff series, a 6-volume 
institutional history published by the Office of Joint 
History (Wilmington: M. Glazier, 1979-1992).  Also useful 
are Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War 
Crises (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), and 
Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First 
Twenty-Five Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1976).  
 
3 Fred Greene, “The Military View of American National 
Policy, 1904 – 1940,” The American Historical Review 66 
(January 1961): 354-77.  Direct quotation found on page 
354.   
 
4 Louis Morton, “Interservice Co-operation and Political-
Military Collaboration,” in Total War and Cold War: 
Problems in Civilian Control of the Military, ed. Harry L. 
Coles (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962), 133. 
   
5 Morton, “Interservice Co-operation,” 132-6. 
   
6 Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American 
Foreign Policy, 1898 – 1914 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1973), 403-5. 
   
7 Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1890 – 1939 
(Portland: Frank Cass, 2002), 38, 177, 178.  A listing of 
the various color plans listing is found primarily on page 
38.  Bracketed text is my own, added for clarity. 
 
12 
 
8 Edward S. Miller, War Plan ORANGE: The U.S. Strategy to 
Defeat Japan, 1897 – 1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1991), 9. 
 
9 Miller, War Plan ORANGE, 9-18, 77-85, 133-8, 180-8, 213-
22, 267-75, 323-30.   
 
10 Ernest R. May, “The Development of Political-Military 
Consultation in the United States,” Political Science 
Quarterly 70 (June 1955): 162. 
 13
CHAPTER II 
 
TOWARD NEW MANAGEMENT: 
 
TRADITIONS IN INTERSERVICE RELATIONS, 1847-1903 
 
  
Instances of cooperation and coordination between the 
U.S. Army and U.S. Navy predated the creation of the Joint 
Board by over half a century earlier.  During the Mexican 
War (1846–1848), the services coordinated their operations 
to land forces, besiege, and capture the Mexican coast city 
of Veracruz in 1847.  During the American Civil War (1861-
1865) Union military and naval forces worked side-by-side 
in 1863 to defeat their entrenched Confederate foe at 
Vicksburg.  Both campaigns involved generals and admirals 
acting amicably and in unison during amphibious operations.  
Yet such an ad hoc method of interservice action proved 
just one tradition of managing American military operations 
by the twentieth century. 
Following the 1898 Spanish-American War, as the burden 
of administering a vastly expanded commercial empire 
increased, and service missions changed, civilian 
authorities also created a tradition of permanent 
consultative bodies.  This shift toward new management 
occurred most noticeably within the individual services, 
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first with creation of the Navy General Board in 1900 and 
later in 1903 with the establishment of the Army General 
Staff.  By 1903, the newly-founded Joint Board thus 
inherited two traditions of managing American military 
strategy: ad hoc innovations by individual officers and 
recommendations made by service consultative bodies.   
At both Veracruz in 1847 and Vicksburg, Mississippi, 
in 1863, admirals and generals together successfully 
coordinated amphibious assaults and sieges against their 
opponent.  Attacking in unison, commanding officers from 
both services achieved overall victory through an informal 
process characterized by harmony and unity.1  
Yet early success in Mexico obscured two profound 
structural deficiencies in American military planning.  For 
one, President James K. Polk quite literally assumed the 
commander-in-chief role granted him under the Constitution 
during the initial phases of the Veracruz campaign.  The 
civilian President poured over theater reports personally, 
assuming the burdens of strategic planning without the 
company and guidance of any high-ranking military officers.  
In this regard, Polk “had every intent of being his own 
chief of staff and would use his cabinet members. . .as a 
kind of “operational plans” division.”2  Secretary of War 
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William Marcy and Secretary of the Navy John Mason found 
themselves performing supporting roles.   
The Veracruz campaign also demonstrated how partisan 
political calculations hampered the efficient calculation 
of American military strategy.  The civilian President 
considered military officers for the post of commanding 
general largely according to their political party 
loyalties. The Democrat Polk suspected General Scott and 
General Zachary Taylor – both supporters of the Whig Party 
– as dangerous to his political standing.  Returning from 
the war as possible war heroes, both generals had the 
potential to spoil his reelection to the White House.3  The 
potential for future commander-in-chiefs not to delegate or 
to decide command positions along partisan lines remained 
unresolved structural faults in American military strategy.  
 Following the Civil War, changes in service missions 
introduced additional needs for coordinating structures 
within the military branches themselves.  Historian Walter 
Millis collectively termed these mission changes elements 
of a “managerial revolution.”  Policymakers concerned 
themselves with how best to organize and apply a nation’s 
industrial might to best achieve national interests.4   
Unlike before the Civil War, Millis argued, civilian and 
 16
military authorities perceived fighting wars as the primary 
role of professionalized, military elites.   
Historian Samuel P. Huntington elucidated Millis’ 
managerial revolution theory further in his work The 
Solider and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil 
Military Relations.  According to Huntington, maintaining 
efficacy now required that military leaders routinely plan 
and prepare for war during times of peace.  The formulation 
of military strategy constituted a two-fold process.  
First, civilian authorities articulated national policies 
objectives; then, select military officers in their 
respective service staffs recommended strategic courses of 
action toward achieving such ends.5  
A clear example of innovation towards this type of 
military management related to changes made in the primary 
mission of the U.S. Navy.  By the early 1870s, the U.S. 
economy centered increasingly on overseas commerce.  With 
the goal of continuing to achieve such wealth, senators and 
representatives began to raise new and fundamental 
questions concerning the future role of American naval 
forces and the need to defend national commerce.  Both at 
the Capitol and in the Navy Department, the desirability of 
a navy able to project power abroad and protect American 
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shipping began to enter a discussion usually concerned more 
with coast defense.  For the next twenty years, the heart 
of national defense once vested in forts and ironclads 
along the coast gradually advanced toward a “New Navy” 
composed of much larger battleships able to contend with 
opponents much further out at sea.6
The linkage between a military strategy of offensive 
naval force and American commerce found strong voice by the 
end of the nineteenth century.  In his book The Influence 
of Sea Power Upon History, 1660 – 1783, published in 1890, 
and his later article “The Interest of America in Sea 
Power, Present and Future” published in 1897, Alfred Thayer 
Mahan discussed the purpose, strategic objectives, and 
missions of modern navies.  Mahan argued that throughout 
history the acquisition of commercial shipping constituted 
the very reason for having a navy.  Using the successes and 
failures of various European nations for historical 
reference, he concluded that in order to gain and maintain 
significant national and economic strength, a nation 
required a navy capable of commanding the seas and 
projecting power in both peace and war.  An essential 
component for commanding the sea was a chain of colonies 
abroad, specific points serving not only as commercial 
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entrepôt, but also as links of stations for fueling and 
repairing the steam-powered fleet.7
 In “The Interest of America in Sea Power” Mahan argued 
for the practical applications of his theory.  Instead of 
focusing on the protection of the coast as it had 
traditionally done, Mahan contended the U.S. Navy should 
instead advance away from continental shores, projecting 
its power globally and seeking a singularly decisive 
victory against a wartime naval foe.  Meanwhile, soldiers 
would garrison the harbor fortifications necessary to 
secure protected naval bases while those few sailors not 
ordered out to command the sea would man torpedo boats used 
solely in a localized, coast defense role.8  Through his 
pen Mahan helped secure the Navy an unprecedented position 
as the first line of American defenses.  In addition, Mahan 
and his writings also introduced needs and a strategy that 
required greater management in both services.     
 The call for new administration quickly found an 
influential following among civilian and military circles.  
Admiral Henry C. Taylor, Naval War College president and 
eventually Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, proved a 
staunch adherent for cooperation between the services.  A 
letter dated 27 April 1896 from Secretary of the Navy 
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William McAdoo to Taylor reveals that both desired army-
navy cooperation in coast defense.  That same year, Taylor 
sought the establishment of a centralized “Joint Board of 
the Army and Navy.”9  Although the idea failed to 
materialize immediately into any type of formal joint 
administrative organization, Taylor’s ideas represented a 
profound ideological shift in the traditional management of 
military planning. 
By 1898 the United States and Spain were at war.  
During hostilities the need arose again for soldiers and 
sailors to work together.  Yet unlike the operations in 
Mexico and along the Mississippi River, interservice 
divisiveness characterized the Cuban campaign.  Major 
General William R. Shafter believed that victory required – 
with naval assistance - first capturing the high ground 
around Santiago.  In contrast, Rear Admiral William T. 
Sampson sought to attack forts guarding the Spanish 
squadron in Santiago harbor, in order to force a decisive 
battle at sea with the Spanish fleet. Both officers pursued 
their own strategy, and ultimately both translated into 
American military victory over Spain.10   Yet the Cuban 
campaign led American civilian authorities to interest 
themselves not only in the strategic questions of what 
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positions to defend, but also the logistical concerns of 
how best to defend those positions with available military 
and naval forces.  As American possessions following 
victory stretched from the Caribbean and Cuba across the 
Pacific to the Philippines, civilian policymakers concluded 
cooperation and coordination between the Army and Navy had 
to be not only found but maintained.  
The process began with reform-minded individuals 
within the two services themselves.  By 1900, searching for 
greater administrative efficiency, the undeterred Admiral 
Taylor argued for the gradual development of a navy general 
staff empowered to coordinate intelligence-gathering and 
war planning, duties up to that time assigned to the Naval 
War College and Office of Naval Intelligence.  On 13 March, 
Navy Secretary McAdoo issued General Order 544 to establish 
the General Board of the Navy as an advisory body to the 
Secretary “to ensure the efficient preparation of the fleet 
in case of war and for the naval defense of the coast.”  
Fleet preparation and coast defense were not the only tasks 
assigned to the General Board.  It had numerous other 
tasks, among them studying the size and capabilities of 
foreign navies, recommending the locations as well as 
defense objectives for overseas bases, advising on the 
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desired size and disposition of the fleet, and war planning 
with the Naval War College.11
 Recognizing who composed the naval consultative body 
proved especially key, as the legitimacy behind General 
Board recommendations stemmed in part from the reputation 
of its presiding officer.  Members assigned to the General 
Board included George Dewey, Admiral of the Navy and head 
of the new naval consultative staff; Taylor, now leading 
the highly influential Bureau of Navigation; the Chief of 
the Office of Naval Intelligence and his assistant, as well 
as the Naval War College president and his assistant.  In 
addition to being a war hero, Admiral Dewey retained a high 
degree of personal influence throughout the Navy and 
Capitol Hill following the war.  Consequently, the early 
successes of General Board equated in part with the Admiral 
of the Navy’s “prestige and authority.”12
 While Taylor called for reform in naval management, 
Secretary of War Elihu Root instituted similar 
administrative changes within the Army.  The reforms began 
on 27 November 1901, when Root ordered the creation of the 
War College Board and charged it with studying military 
policy.  The most profound army administrative change, 
however, occurred two years later with the 1903 General 
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Staff Act.  Like the Admiral of the Navy in the General 
Board, an Army Chief of Staff headed a body of officers 
that not only administrated the Army, but also gathered 
military information and educated its officer corps on 
technical matters.  To the War Secretary, the centralized 
Army General Staff acted like the brain, insofar as it 
planned and directed the body of the Army.13
  By 1903, fueled by a mutual desire to avoid future 
interservice acrimony like that found during the Cuban 
campaign in the Spanish-American War, Secretary of War Root 
and Secretary of the Navy William H. Moody established the 
Joint Army and Navy Board through a series of identical 
general orders issued in late July 1903.  Composed of the 
same eight officers assigned to the Navy General Board and 
Army General Staff, the Joint Board had a vague mandate. 
Its charter called for the body to meet “for the purpose of 
conferring upon, discussing, and reaching common 
conclusions regarding all matters calling for the 
cooperation of the two services.”14   
The repercussions from such a nebulous directive were 
serious.  The original orders restricted all officers 
ordered to the Board to military advisors.  With no 
statutory operational authority, admirals and generals had 
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little reason to forge a permanent interservice 
institution.  In practice, Joint Board members found it 
easier to influence their civilian superiors through 
advising channels already in place, in this case the Navy 
General Board and Army General Staff.  From the start, 
functioning outside the flawed confines of the Joint Board 
proved more efficient and effective approach in the 
formulation of American military strategy.      
In the final analysis, the Joint Board from its 
inception inherited management traditions of individual 
networking among officers and recommendations made by 
service consultative bodies.  Victories during the 1847 
campaign at Veracruz and 1863 battle at Vicksburg led to an 
ad hoc method of interservice relations that continued into 
the following century.  For military strategists, amicable 
personal relations between the admirals and generals made 
sense insofar as they translated into success.  
In addition, from the Civil War until the dawn of the 
twentieth century, consultative staffs institutionalized 
what was once an informal process into a more formal 
procedure.  Once individual service missions changed, 
relations between the services gradually evolved toward a 
greater degree of permanency.  After poor interservice 
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relations marred the 1898 Spanish-American War and 
effective administration both within as well as between the 
services became a paramount goal, reformers such as Admiral 
Taylor and Secretary of War Root found support at the 
highest levels of government for creating permanent 
recommendation agencies like the Navy General Board in 1900 
and Army General Staff in 1903.  By 1903, as the reform 
impulse culminated with both civilian service secretaries’ 
calling for a permanent Joint Board, U.S. military 
strategists were somewhat cool toward the unprecedented 
body, and continued traditional management practices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1 Paul C. Clark, Jr., and Edward H. Moseley, “D-Day 
Veracruz, 1847 – A Grand Design,” Joint Forces Quarterly 10 
(Winter 1995 – 1996): 107-13; Charles Royster, The 
Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall 
Jackson, and the Americans (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 
110-4; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry Freedom: The Civil 
War Era (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 587. 
 
2 John S. D. Eisenhower, “Polk and His Generals,” in Essays 
on the Mexican War, ed. Douglas W. Richmond (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1986), 42. 
  
3 Clark and Moseley, “D-Day Veracruz, 1847 – A Grand 
Design,” 105-6; Eisenhower, “Polk and His Generals,” 42; 
Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common 
Defense: A Military History of the United States of 
America, rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 148-9. 
    
4 Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military 
History, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1986), 137. 
   
5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The 
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 19th ed.  
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2002), 254-69. 
    
6 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. 
Navy, 1890 – 1990 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993), 9-12.  For a more detailed account see also Mark 
Russell Shulman, Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea 
Power, 1882 – 1893 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995) 
and Robert Seager II, “Ten Years Before Mahan: The 
Unofficial Case for the New Navy, 1880 – 1890,” The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 40 (December 1953): 
491-512.  
 
7 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon 
History, 1660 – 1783 (1890; repr., New York: Dover 
Publications, Inc., 1987), 25–89.  
 
 26
 
 
8 Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Interest of America in Sea 
Power, Present and Future”, listed as “Preparedness for 
Naval War,” in Mahan on Naval Warfare: Selections from the 
Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, ed. Allan 
Westcott, 128-34 (Mineola: Dover Publications, Inc., 1999); 
J.A.S. Grenville, “Diplomacy and War Plans in the United 
States, 1890 – 1917,” in The War Plans of the Great Powers, 
1890 – 1914, ed. Paul M. Kennedy, 29 (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1979). 
 
9 Daniel Joseph Costello, “Planning for War: A History of 
the General Board of the Navy, 1900 – 1914” (Ph.D. diss., 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1968), 23, 39–40. 
   
10 Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States 
Army in the Spanish – American War (1971; repr., College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 204–5, 244. 
    
11 H.C. Taylor, “Memorandum on General Staff for the U.S. 
Navy,” Naval Institute Proceedings 26 (September 1900): 
441-8; Costello, “Planning for War,” 30-1. 
 
12 Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1890 – 1939 
(Portland: Frank Cass, 2002), 29; Costello, “Planning for 
War,” 30-1.  In addition to Ronald Spector’s findings in 
Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George 
Dewey (1974; repr., Charleston: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1988), 122-3, Admiral Dewey’s reputation is 
especially clear in letters written by Rear Admiral Taylor 
to Secretary of the Navy John D. Long.  See Rear Admiral H. 
C. Taylor to Secretary Long, 28 March 1901 and 8 June 1901, 
in Gardner Weld Allen, ed., Papers of John Davis Long, 1897 
– 1904 (Norwood: Plimpton Press, 1939), 78:359, 78:368.  
    
13 Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 
2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 314-
23. 
 
14 Navy Department General Order No. 136, 18 July 1903, 
Joint Board 301, Nonserial Documents, Roll 2, M 1421, 
Records of the Joint Board, 1903 – 1947, National Archives 
Microfilm Publications, Washington, D.C.; Army Headquarters 
 27
 
General Order No. 107, 20 July 1903, Joint Board 301, 
Nonserial Documents, Roll 2, M 1421, Records of the Joint 
Board, 1903 – 1947, National Archives Microfilm 
Publications, Washington, D.C.  Admiral Dewey, Rear Admiral 
Taylor, Captain John E. Pillsbury, and Commander William J. 
Barnette represented the Navy, while Major Generals S.B.M. 
Young and Henry C. Corbin, and Brigadier Generals Tasker H. 
Bliss and Wallace F. Randolph represented the Army. 
 
 28
CHAPTER III 
 
PROTECTING SHORELINES: 
 
THE HOMELAND AND COAST DEFENSE 
 
 
 The mission of securing American harbors and coasts 
from enemy attack has preoccupied military and naval 
strategists alike since the nation’s founding.  Following 
the War of 1812, continued fears of European naval forces 
assaulting important coastal cities led an 1816 board 
headed by French military engineer Simon Bernard to 
recommend Atlantic seacoast fortifications.1  From northern 
cities such as Boston and New York southward to Charleston, 
South Carolina, the Army and Navy found themselves working 
together in the name of national security.  Yet while these 
traditional fears and fortifications continued into the 
early twentieth century, the means to securing such 
national objectives changed in a profound way.   
In the time period between the Confederate surrender 
at Appomattox and early years of the twentieth century, 
civilian authorities established several boards to assess 
the adequacy of American coast defenses.  Interservice 
consultative bodies like the 1866 Harbor Defense Board, 
1885 Endicott Board, and the 1904 Taft Board decided where 
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best to locate such naval stations.  In the end, however, 
it was the Joint Board that determined how to protect these 
defensive areas.   
Joint Board records reveal naval officers used the 
permanent interservice body as a primary channel for 
pursuing an unprecedented role in American coast defense 
strategy.  While their army counterparts continued to argue 
for the U.S. Army’s traditional mission of manning and 
managing fortifications, naval members of the Joint Board 
advanced a decisive battle strategy aimed at destroying 
enemy naval forces before they entered range of shore.  
From its inception in 1903 until World War I, the Joint 
Board found itself an important interservice forum that 
deliberated new preventative coastal measures for both the 
Atlantic and Pacific seaboards.   
Coast defense concerns confronted by the Joint Board 
originated in strategic deliberations that started shortly 
after the Civil War.  In March 1866, Secretary of the Navy 
Gideon Welles established a temporary Joint Army and Navy 
Board that considered, experimented with, and reported upon 
harbor defense measures.  Commonly called the Harbor 
Defense Board, the body of army and navy officers 
functioned solely as a consultative body, reporting on 
 30
subjects submitted to it by the Navy Secretary alone.  
During its five-month existence, the main issue that 
confronted the Board was how ironclad vessels, channel 
obstructions, and torpedoes would be used “in existing or 
proposed forts and batteries.”2
 Actions taken by the Harbor Defense Board proved 
insightful for understanding methods used by the services 
in deciding overall military strategy.  For one, the 
admirals and generals agreed on basic military operations.  
Through the findings of three subcommittees composed of one 
Army and one Navy officer, the Board members collectively 
predicated American harbor defenses on a combination of 
naval ironclad vessels, fortifications such as guns and 
batteries manned by soldiers, and coastal obstructions 
working in combination.3  American security required a 
joint effort: the army manned harbor forts while the navy 
simultaneously defended the local harbor waters. 
 The Harbor Defense Board demonstrated a remarkable 
degree of army-navy corroboration.  Military and naval 
officers together determined harbor defense recommendations 
with no reported incidents of interservice acrimony.  Yet 
the final report highlighted two serious administrative 
challenges posed by the Harbor Defense Board’s civilian 
 31
superior.  For one, Navy Secretary Welles restrained the 
flow of technical information.  On 9 March the civilian 
secretary issued orders to the Board and its subcommittees 
stating that they were “not to communicate with the 
Departments or with the Bureaus, or outside individuals, 
except through the Board, or in case of emergency, through 
the Chairman of the Board.”4  Board chairman Rear Admiral 
Charles H. Davis also impressed upon Secretary Welles the 
lack of necessary appropriations for experimentation.5  
Stripped of information and money, the army-navy body 
became little more than a forum for discussing the 
efficiency of harbor defense measures.  By April 1866 the 
Harbor Defense Board concluded its work and dissolved.                  
Within twenty years President Grover Cleveland 
appointed a Board of Fortifications on March 1885.  Headed 
by Secretary of War William C. Endicott, the consultative 
body commonly called the “Endicott Board” consisted of 
three army officers, three navy officers, and two 
civilians.6  In their final report, the Board members 
stated that American seacoast ports – especially those 
located along the eastern seaboard – were dangerously 
vulnerable to foreign naval attacks.  According to the 
members, commercial ports, as well as the foreign and 
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coastal trade flowing from them, needed more modern 
defenses.  To this end, the Board concluded ports 
stretching from Maine to Virginia required stronger 
floating batteries coupled with an offensive naval arm.  
The estimated total cost of modernizing the fortifications 
equaled roughly $126 million dollars.7  
The Endicott Board fortification recommendations 
remained standard coast defense policy for the next twenty 
years.  Following the Spanish-American War, as the United 
States accumulated new insular possessions, effective 
management surfaced as a general concern for all American 
bases.  As a result, the Navy Department issued General 
Order 128 in May 1903, which outlined new naval districts 
and regulations for governing those districts.  The 
provisions charged the Navy Bureau of Navigation with 
general supervision of all naval districts.  In addition, 
Article 26 required the naval district Commandant “enter 
into a hearty cooperation with officers of both Army and 
Navy holding neighboring commands with the object of 
promoting the success of such military operations as may be 
in progress.”  Consequently, the Navy Bureau of Navigation 
Chief as well as the Army Chief of Artillery collaborated 
on coast defense.  As before, interservice cooperation 
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continued as a major element in American homeland coast 
defenses.8
With coast defense locations predetermined by two 
previous consultative bodies, the Joint Board in its early 
years was left with responsibilities centered on how best 
to protect them.  Interestingly it did not execute this 
task alone.  The Board echoed location recommendations 
specified by separate, smaller army-navy boards.  For 
example, in early April 1904 Admiral Dewey informed both 
civilian service secretaries that the admirals and generals 
advised supplying four hundred submarine mines for defense.  
The recommendation stemmed from an identical proposal 
advanced by the Fort Totten Torpedo Board in New York.  
Just like the Torpedo Board, the Joint Board recommended 
two hundred mines would go to the Atlantic coast at Fort 
Totten, New York, and the other two hundred mines would go 
to the Presidio in San Francisco, California, on the 
Pacific coast.  These mines were to be stored at the two 
locations ready for placement at ports along the coast in 
time of need.9       
Beginning in autumn 1904, however, the potential for 
greater Joint Board influence emerged as civilian leaders 
began discussing changes to Endicott Board policies.  On 27 
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October 1904 the Secretary of the Navy ordered the Joint 
Board to consider and recommend possible policy 
modifications.10  The Army Chief of Artillery proposed that 
any future Boards include naval membership.  Story 
concluded “the navy has nearly an equal interest with the 
coast artillery,” for an offensive naval strategy required 
freedom provided by strong coast defense.11
By 1905 deliberations on coast defense entered into 
full swing.  President Theodore Roosevelt informed the 
Joint Board that he believed “harbor defenses can be 
completed effectively and satisfactorily with a much less 
expenditure of money” than previously recommended by the 
Endicott Board.  Yet rather than tasking the Joint Board 
with finding a cost-effective solution, the President 
instead called upon his Secretary of War, William H. Taft, 
to formulate new coast defense policies.  To this end, the 
President charged his Cabinet secretary with recommending 
cheaper harbor defense measures, as well as producing a 
prioritized list for unfinished harbor defense projects.12     
Taft presided over a board composed predominately of 
high-ranking Army officers.  In addition to Army Chief of 
Staff Lieutenant General Adna R. Chaffee and Assistant Army 
Chief of Staff Major General George L. Gillespie, what 
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became commonly called the Taft Board also consisted of 
Brigadier Generals Adolphus W. Greeley (Chief Signal 
Officer), William Crozier (Chief of Ordnance), John P. 
Story (Chief of Artillery), and Alexander Mackenzie (Chief 
of Engineers).  The Navy had only two representatives 
assigned to the Board, Captains Charles M. Thomas and 
Charles S. Sperry.  Major General George W. Goethals was 
the Board secretary.13  
Following months of deliberation and study, the 
consultative body issued its final report on 1 February 
1906.  Forecasted within its first few pages were motives 
for an enemy to attack American coasts.  Taft Board members 
concluded increased national commercial wealth made the 
United States “even more tempting inducements to attack.”  
Technological advances in steam propulsion granted enemy 
vessels a distinct time advantage.  In addition, eastern 
seaboard cities such as Baltimore contained concentrated 
center of railroads – the commercial lifelines of an 
industrial nation.14  
In contrast to the Atlantic-oriented Boards that 
preceded it, the Taft Board emphasized the primary 
importance of Pacific coast defenses.  Its members 
highlighted especially the need to maintain the Puget Sound 
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station in Washington.  An extensive array of railroads, 
the Board concluded, gave Puget Sound “the greatest 
strategic and commercial importance.”  The area also 
contained developing agricultural and manufacturing market.  
In addition to its commercial benefits, Puget Sound 
protected the nearby Bremerton Navy Yard, and contained the 
only Pacific coast dock capable of taking a battleship.15
The final report provided a new strategic blueprint 
for coast defense in two ways.  For one, it clarified 
harbor defenses “can not depend on the presence of any war 
vessel to resist naval attack.”  Second, the Board 
concluded that future harbor defenses, while still 
employing submarines, nonetheless required a military force 
and fortifications “sufficiently strong to repel and naval 
attack that may reasonably be expected on its own.”  In 
both instances, the recommendations were clear: the Army 
and its soldiers were now the primary service responsible 
for American coast defense.  To meet the new policy, Taft 
and the other members prioritized entrances to the 
Chesapeake Bay, Long Island Sound, and Puget Sound as ports 
that needed to be defended most.16  
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The Taft Board immediately found a receptive ear in 
the White House.  President Roosevelt reiterated many of 
the body’s findings in a message to Congress.  He stated  
the necessity for a complete and adequate system of 
coast defense is greater to-day than twenty years ago, 
for the increased wealth of the country offers more 
tempting inducements to attack, and a hostile fleet 
can reach our coast in a much shorter period of time.  
The fact that we now have a navy does not in any wise 
diminish the importance of coast defenses; on the 
contrary, that fact emphasizes their value and the 
necessity for their construction.  It is an accepted 
naval maxim that a navy can be used to strategic 
advantage only when acting on the offensive, and it 
can be free to so operate only after our coast defense 
is reasonably secure and so recognized by the country.  
It was due to the securely defended condition of the 
Japanese ports that the Japanese fleet was free to 
seek out and watch its proper objective – the Russian 
fleet – without fear of interruption or recall to 
guard its home ports against raids by the Vladivostok 
squadron.  This, one of the most valuable lessons of 
the late war in the East, is worthy of serious 
consideration by our country, with its extensive coast 
line, its many important harbors, and its many wealthy 
manufacturing coast cities.17
 
Like the Taft Board, Roosevelt emphasized strong American 
commercial ports and harbors would surely tantalize newer, 
faster enemy naval forces.  The imperative for a larger, 
offensive-oriented U.S. Navy gained even more momentum.  
Building better guns and forts proved major components in 
any national preparation for future wars.18      
Not surprisingly, navy leaders on the Joint Board – 
who had found themselves largely on the outside looking in 
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during the Taft Board deliberations – used the interservice 
body as a forum for suggesting alternatives that involved 
greater naval influence.  During the months of Taft Board 
proceedings, the Navy General Board advocated Army control 
of submarine mine defenses and Navy control of water 
traffic.19  Within the Joint Board, a committee composed of 
Rear Admiral Richard Wainwright and Brigadier General W. W. 
Wotherspoon issued a final report outlining Army and Navy 
responsibilities in Defensive Sea Areas (DSAs).  Both 
commercial and military reasons influenced the choice and 
final placement passageways.  According to the proposal, 
the Navy would organize a piloting and control system for 
vessels both entering and exiting coastal port while the 
Army would be given the power to halt temporarily all port 
traffic – except armed naval vessels – for repairing 
submarine defenses.  President Roosevelt approved the 
proposed regulations in May 1906.20    
All future Joint Board proposals concerning coast 
defenses mirrored the Taft Board recommendations.  By 
November 1907, Brigadier Generals Arthur Murray, W.W. 
Wotherspoon, and Captain John E. Pillsbury of the Navy 
General Board issued a final report that Coos Bay, Oregon 
required no mine defenses.  The Joint Board subcommittee 
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concluded the poor quality of the coal stored there, and 
its distant location from the bay entrance, “render the 
risk of its seizure very doubtful.”21 The Puget Sound site 
emphasized in 1904 remained a primary component of Pacific 
coast defenses. 
Concerns over Pacific shoreline security and Japan 
continued into the following year.  In February 1908, Joint 
Board members considered transferring coast defense 
materiel to the Puget Sound station in Washington.  
Admirals and generals ultimately advised against such an 
action in the short-term.  Facing decreased force numbers, 
large materiel transfers to the Pacific were given less 
precedence than Atlantic and Gulf defenses.  The Joint 
Board figured present Army defenses “will be adequate if 
assisted by proper vessels of the Navy.”  With diminished 
hopes of obtaining the future appropriation requests made 
to Congress, the Joint Board recommended the Army prepare 
projects and the Navy begin plans for transferring coast 
artillery and vessels to Puget Sound “in case of war with a 
foreign power based in the Pacific becomes imminent.”  
During the next five years defense of the Puget Sound Naval 
Shipyard became more important as it was expanded to 
include a large battleship dry dock.22  
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No discussion on coast defense occurred during Joint 
Board meetings for close to a decade.  This proved of 
little surprise, for by World War I the Joint Board found 
itself with little influence.  The most senior Joint Board 
members became increasingly involved with the war effort in 
Europe.  In addition, the junior members downgraded its 
importance.  Board secretary Captain H.S. Knapp affirmed 
his belief that interservice decisions could and were being 
made by the newly established Chief of Naval Operations and 
the Army Chief of Staff consulting directly with one 
another rather than going through the Joint Board.  While 
Knapp concluded the Joint Board “should obtain from 
subordinate officers of the Army and Navy such assistance 
as they may need in arriving at decisions in the matter,” 
the fact remained the Joint Board appeared to have lost its 
favor.23
Policymaking at this time confirmed the lack of Joint 
Board participation.  Indeed, from late 1917 until early 
1919 the Joint Board appeared simply as a rubber stamp to 
coast defense recommendations acted upon by civilian 
superiors.  The Joint Army and Navy Board on Aeronautic 
Cognizance informed both civilian service secretaries that 
responsibility for placing non-controlled mines outside 
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DSAs belonged to Navy, while placing non-controlled mines 
inside the DSAs rested with the Army.  The Joint Board, 
with little or no discussion, informed the secretaries of 
its approval.  Both Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and 
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels approved the 
recommendation.24
From the Civil War until World War I coastal defense 
constituted an important part of overall American military 
strategy.  The large institutional changes that civilian 
policymakers instituted throughout these fifty years 
required interservice cooperation.  The Harbor Defense 
Board proved the first notable – albeit temporary – attempt 
to study and recommend coast defense modifications since 
the 1816 Bernard Board.  Over the next half century, as the 
adequacy of American coast defenses again came into 
question, presidents such as Grover Cleveland and Theodore 
Roosevelt formed interservice consultative boards.  The 
Endicott and Taft Boards like the Endicott Board together 
decided where best to locate such naval stations. 
Yet in the final analysis, protecting American 
shorelines from attacks proved a task extending beyond the 
Joint Board.  When it came to determining how best to 
protect these defensive areas, the members of the Joint 
 42
Board found themselves part of a network of numerous 
interservice agencies involved in the deciding coast 
defense.  Civilian service secretaries deemed 
recommendations from the Fort Totten Torpedo Board and 
Joint Army and Navy Board on Aeronautic Cognizance Records 
similarly as those put forth by the Joint Board.  In the 
end, the admirals and generals of the Joint Board simply 
sanctioned such advice by issuing almost verbatim 
recommendations.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
POLICING THE AMERICAN MEDITERRANEAN: 
 
THE CARIBBEAN AND CUBA 
 
 
The turn of the twentieth century marked a revolution 
in the roles assigned to American armed forces.  As a 
result of the war with Spain, the United States acquired 
new possessions that stretched from the Pacific to the 
Caribbean.  Soldiers and sailors found themselves in 
unprecedented roles that ranged from defending American 
commercial investments in China to protecting strategic 
interests in Panama.  While operating in foreign lands and 
patrolling along foreign waters, both the army and navy had 
a need for greater interservice cooperation and 
coordination than ever before.   
The need for harmonious army-navy relations outside 
the continental United States occurred ironically 
relatively close to its shores.  In addition to protecting 
commercial investments during the perennial civil unrest in 
Latin and Central American countries – and their resulting 
coups d’etat – the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary demanded 
American policymakers remain attuned to Caribbean affairs.  
The continued possibilities of European nations intervening 
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from the Atlantic required American military authorities 
regard Cuba with a steady strategic eye.  Ultimately both 
these concerns involved the Joint Board, as any American 
actions in the region required a viable threat of military 
force behind it.  Thus from 1903 onward the interservice 
consultative body served as an institution that helped 
shape American military strategy in the region. 
Understanding Joint Board decision-making regarding 
the Caribbean requires knowledge of the region’s basic 
geography.  The Caribbean region constitutes the area from 
the Bahamas across to Mexico, southward to the Isthmus of 
Panama, and eastward along the coast of South America.1  
The Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, as well as the 
littoral areas of Central America and South America make up 
this area.   
Any map of the region immediately illustrates the 
strategic value of Cuba for the United States.  The largest 
island nation in the West Indies sits astride access points 
to the region’s two largest bodies of water.  The direct 
route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico runs 
along the northern coast of Cuba, while the nation’s 
southern shores sit alongside the northeastern entrance to 
the Caribbean Sea.  The Caribbean Sea entrance assumes even 
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greater commercial and strategic importance with the Panama 
Canal, for the isthmian pass discussed in the next chapter 
connects the Atlantic World to rich markets of the Pacific 
Rim.            
The United States began hinting at achieving Caribbean 
hegemony during the early nineteenth century.  In his 
Annual Message to Congress in 1823, President James Monroe 
tied American security interests to the Western Hemisphere 
at large. The President directed his new policy against 
traditional European powers. Claiming “that we should 
consider any attempt…to extend their system to any portion 
of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety,” 
Monroe concluded 
the Governments who have declared their independence 
and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on 
great consideration and on just principles, 
acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for 
the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any 
other manner their destiny, by any European power in 
any other light than as the manifestation of an 
unfriendly disposition toward the United States.2
 
With such bold rhetoric Monroe thrust the United States 
into Caribbean affairs. The President predicated American 
security on protecting the independence and sovereignty 
rights of all Western Hemisphere nations, not just the 
United States. Although lacking military forces capable of 
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deterring far-stronger imperial powers like Great Britain 
and France, the new policy assured New World America would 
concern itself with Old World European aggrandizement in 
the region.      
In addition the Monroe Doctrine, financial capital 
helped maintain U.S. interest in the Caribbean.  While 
American policymakers attached commercial significance to 
Caribbean as far back the nation’s founding itself, 
agricultural and especially industrial investments in the 
region reached unprecedented levels by the middle of the 
nineteenth century.  According to historian Walter LaFeber, 
a booming industrial revolution beginning in 1843, as well 
as the search for new foreign agricultural markets, fueled 
heavy American commercial investment in the Caribbean.  As 
continental expansion westward ended, Cuba and its 
potential for rich import and export markets garnered 
special U.S. attention.  American businessman obtained 
titles to many of the vast sugar plantations that covered 
the island nation.  By the 1890s, maintaining the security 
of those private sugar investments proved a driving force 
in American Caribbean diplomacy.3            
As American commercial investments grew, Monroe’s 
concerns first hinted at seventy-five years earlier began 
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to appear.  By the 1890s the United States government found 
itself confronted with British expansion into the 
Caribbean.  American Anglophobia reached a fever pitch with 
the 1895 Venezuelan Crisis, in which Great Britain claimed 
a large portion of jungle along the disputed Venezuela-
Guiana border.  Secretary of State Richard Olney responded 
in short order, writing to London that U.S. national 
security was “concerned with the maintenance of the 
independence of every American state as against any 
European power.”  The chief American diplomat affirmed the 
Monroe Doctrine, arguing the United States could not 
tolerate European threats against the territorial 
sovereignty of any Caribbean nation.4
The set of diplomatic standards American diplomats 
applied to Old World countries in the Caribbean was far 
different than those imposed on itself.  Just prior to 
entering the Spanish-American War, the U.S. denied any 
intention of annexing Cuba.  Washington pledged itself to 
the principle of Cuban independence through the 1898 Teller 
Amendment.  Yet promise never translated into reality.  
Following victory over Spain, the United States Army 
managed Cuban affairs through four military jurisdictions.  
Three years later, during formal debate of the 1901 Army 
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Appropriation Act, Senator Orville H. Platt (R-CT) proposed 
legislation that stated Cuba could never enter foreign 
treaties that “might impair her independence.”  In 
addition, the Platt Amendment authorized the United States 
government to intervene in Cuba for “the preservation of 
Cuban independence and for the maintenance of a government 
adequate for the protection of life, property, and 
individual liberty.”  President William McKinley signed the 
legislation into law with little debate, and on 12 June 
1901 Cuban leaders adopted the amendment into their 
constitution.  With the stroke of a pen and diplomatic 
pressure, the United States assured for itself a role in 
Cuban defense.5   
The threat of European intervention in the Caribbean 
continued into the new century.  On 20 December 1902, Great 
Britain and Germany instituted a naval blockade of 
Venezuela in the name of collecting unpaid foreign loans.  
Caracas responded to the Anglo-German naval force by 
calling for U.S. arbitration of the dispute.  During this 
second crisis in Venezuela, President Theodore Roosevelt 
dispatched the United States fleet – coincidently already 
concentrated in the Caribbean at Culebra for a war gaming 
exercise – as a precautionary measure in case of failed 
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diplomacy.  In light of this American action, London and 
Berlin decided ultimately not to increase their blockade 
force.6  Luck and holding a tough naval line expanded the 
U.S. preponderance of power in the Caribbean. 
With an official role in Cuban defense established and 
the perception of projecting military force affirmed, the 
question then became where to locate an American Caribbean 
naval station.  In early July 1903 Secretary of War Elihu 
Root and Secretary of the Navy William H. Moody decided 
Cuba should contain the primary site.  As the civilian 
secretaries reached this understanding, they also concluded 
that the Joint Board should discuss the details concerning 
such a base.  In a memorandum dated 8 July 1903, Secretary 
Root stated “all questions as to fortification, or manning 
of fortifications, and the relations between the two arms 
of the service in respect thereof, will be referred to a 
joint committee of the army and navy for report and further 
consideration by the executive branch of the government.”7   
The new Joint Board became solely a forum for 
discussion on strategy and service relations.  It was to 
have only advisory powers.  Neither Secretary Root nor 
Secretary Moody assured access for the Joint Board members 
to all information required to conduct their investigations 
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and deliberations.  Lacking access to the most current 
diplomatic policies and processes, the members found 
themselves and their decisions predicated on incomplete 
information.  Individual perceptions of international 
events, and personal relationships between military 
officers and their civilian superiors, served as policy 
sources.  The memorandum also restricted Joint Board tasks 
only to recommendations on fortifications and questions 
regarding interservice relations.  Given these unwritten 
restrictions, responsibilities for broader strategic issues 
remained dangerously undefined.            
The blurred line between civilian policymakers and 
military strategists regarding the Caribbean achieved 
clarity by year’s end.  As Joint Board work began in 
earnest, the admirals and generals together – and on their 
own accord – considered where in Cuba to locate the 
American naval station.  On 28 December 1903 Admiral George 
Dewey, in his capacity as presiding officer, informed both 
civilian service secretaries to inform the President that 
the Board recommended Guantanamo and Bahia Honda as 
potential sites.  The Joint Board also unanimously advised 
setting aside land on the surrounding hill tops for a naval 
wireless telegraph station.  Eventually President Theodore 
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Roosevelt received the Joint Board memorandum from his 
civilian service secretaries, and approved the proposed 
action for fortifying the sites in relatively short order.  
Following the President’s order on 5 January 1904, the War 
Department issued a general order making it official.8
Later that year, Roosevelt announced in his annual 
message to Congress that the United States would serve as 
an international policing power in the Western Hemisphere.  
In what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary, the 
President tasked the nation with serving as the guardian of 
all Pan-American neighbors and the protector of their 
sovereign rights.  Henceforth any intervention in Caribbean 
affairs by a European power would be regarded as a security 
threat to the United States.  The policy remained the 
diplomatic standard into the Woodrow Wilson presidency over 
eight years later.9  
While well-received domestically, Roosevelt’s words 
found an apprehensive reception among Caribbean neighbors.  
Addressing a gathering of Pan-American delegates at the 
Third International American Conference held at Rio de 
Janeiro in July 1906, Secretary of State Elihu Root sought 
to assure his audience the Roosevelt Corollary to the 
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Monroe Doctrine did not reflect a policy of U.S. 
imperialism.  He stated 
we wish for no victories but those of peace; for no 
territory except our own; for no sovereignty except 
the sovereignty over ourselves.  We deem the 
independence and equal rights of the smallest and 
weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as 
much respect as those of the greatest empire; and we 
deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty 
of the weak against the strong.  We neither claim nor 
desire any rights, or privileges, or power that we do 
not freely concede to every American republic.10    
  
Yet those who doubted the sincerity of Root’s words had 
their fears realized in short order.     
Declaration of the Roosevelt Corollary assured that 
construction of a Cuban base assumed primary importance for 
American military strategists.  In this regard funding 
became a primary concern.  The Joint Board suggested using 
appropriations set aside in the War Emergency Fund, an 
executive spending account authorized by Congress in March 
1899.  Secretary of War William H. Taft quickly rejected 
the suggestion, commenting the law as written did not 
permit it.11  Nevertheless construction began using building 
funds already appropriated, and Army engineers progressed, 
albeit slowly, into the autumn of 1905.  Brigadier General 
Samuel M. Mills, Army Chief of Artillery, commented to 
Secretary of War William H. Taft that the Navy Department 
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and Army Engineers Corps made “some little progress” on the 
armament emplacements and submarine materiel storehouses.12  
In any event, the naval station project continued into the 
following month until its completion. 
 During these months service strife characterized the 
construction.  Initial land allocations led to interservice 
discord.  On 16 November Secretary Taft remarked to the 
Lieutenant General Adna Chaffee, Army Chief of Staff, that 
a request should be made of the Secretary of Navy “to 
recede to the War Department the tract reserved for a 
harbor master.”  Taft considered the land an essential 
element for future Guantanamo Bay coast defenses.  Two days 
later the War Department dispatched its request to the Navy 
Department.13
The request remained unanswered by the Navy for the 
next two months.  Eventually, Secretary of the Navy Charles 
J. Bonaparte responded.  The proposed land transfer, he 
concluded, would “be an irreparable loss to the station and 
to the Fleet both in peace and in time of war.”  Bonaparte 
justified his statement by arguing “no other area on the 
shore of the bay that presents corresponding facilities.”  
Not surprisingly, the Secretary declined the transfer 
request.14
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  By spring 1907 the Joint Board approached the issue 
from a new angle, concluding the Guantanamo Naval Station 
required an expansion.  Dewey informed Secretary of the 
Navy Victor H. Metcalf in March the current station needed 
more fresh water.  The Joint Board recommended the U.S. 
government extend its naval station reservation limits both 
north and east to capture recently discovered fresh water 
resources.  The proposal, however, faced a diplomatic 
roadblock as Secretary Root denied the request.  Root 
informed the Navy Secretary that such action contrasted 
with Washington’s position as protecting Cuba.15
Despite such opposition, the Joint Board continued its 
push for the expansion of Guantanamo into the following 
year.  In a January 1908 memorandum Dewey remarked to the 
Secretary of the Navy that the Board members were “strongly 
impressed with the necessity for an advanced base in the 
Caribbean.”  The Joint Board linked Guantanamo with control 
of the Atlantic entrance to the Panama Canal.  Concerned 
over the Cuban penchant for civil war and the gradual 
completion of the Panama Canal to the south, the Admiral of 
the Navy further stressed the Joint Board’s support for 
constructing the base at Guantanamo.  The admirals and 
generals recommended immediate construction of mine 
 59
defenses and emplacements for Army coast artillery that 
“would. . .be adequate to withstand any attack reasonably 
to be expected from an enemy not in established control of 
the sea.”16      
By 1910 the recommendations translated into official 
policy, for Guantanamo became the strategic pivot for 
American Caribbean strategy.  On 31 May 1910 Admiral Dewey 
informed both the Secretaries of War and Navy that the 
Joint Board had concluded that Bahia Honda was “no longer 
regarded as being valuable to the United States.”  In a 
remarkable demonstration of political acumen, the Joint 
Board advised ceding the Bahia Honda lease “might prove a 
final argument to induce the Cuban Government to accede to 
the wishes of the United States at Guantanamo.”17  
Beginning that same year the U.S. found an additional 
incentive for solidifying an American Caribbean presence.  
Beginning in 1910 and for the next four years, American 
presidents and their policymakers concerned themselves 
increasingly with the political instability in Mexico.  The 
government headed by Porfirio Díaz encountered stiff 
opposition in 1910.  U.S. President William H. Taft 
publicly supported the Díaz regime, considering that during 
his tenure American business leaders garnered large 
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holdings in the Mexican railroad, mining and oil 
industries.18   But by June 1911 Francisco Madero, a rich 
landowner from northern Mexico, headed what became a 
national revolt and removed Díaz from office.19
Madero, however, did not hold power for long.  Within 
less than six months one of his former generals, Victoriano 
Huerta, turned against Madero.  By 19 February 1913 Huerta 
ousted Madero from office, and had him captured and 
assassinated.  At virtually the same time Huerta assumed 
power in Mexico, Woodrow Wilson entered the White House.  
Horrified by the Madero killing, the former Princeton 
professor refused to grant U.S. diplomatic recognition of 
the Huerta regime.  An end to U.S. arms shipments to Mexico 
and an American business appeal for intervention followed, 
and the clouds of war loomed.20        
Facing such bloody Mexican revolution, the Joint Board 
began contingency planning for operations against Mexico in 
April 1912.  Known as Plan Green, the war plan called for 
an initial naval seizure and temporary occupation of the 
ports of Veracruz and Tampico on the Gulf of Mexico.  Once 
the Navy seized or blockaded all remaining Mexican ports 
along the Pacific and Gulf coasts, the 1st Field Army would 
advance from Veracruz inland toward Mexico City.  Upon 
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landing the 2d Field Army, composed of volunteers, would 
march in conjunction with the first military force.  The 3d 
Field Army would be used as needed.  To the north, 
additional military forces would protect the southern U.S. 
border unless needed for an offensive southward advance.21
By June 1912 the Joint Board emphasized keeping 
Guantanamo as the centerpiece of American military strategy 
in the Caribbean.  The Joint Board concluded it a “well-
situated” naval station due to its geographical proximity 
to both the nearly completed Panama Canal and American Gulf 
coast.  In terms of defense fortifications, the Board 
concluded Guantanamo “should be sufficient to protect the 
repair station and the fleet auxiliaries during the 
temporary absence of the battle fleet.”  Armament 
recommendations reflected this strategic outlook as well, 
as the admirals and generals called for replacing the 
twelve-inch guns already on-site with fourteen-inch or 
sixteen-inch guns.  The Board also called for strengthening 
harbor defenses by creating a front debouching area in 
range of coast guns and mortar fire.22      
John Bartlow Martin commented in his 1978 work U.S. 
Policy in the Caribbean that for over two hundred years the 
United States “has regarded the Caribbean as an American 
 62
lake, vital to our security and generally profitable to our 
business interests.”23  In the final analysis, as the United 
States acquired new and far-reaching possessions following 
the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy found 
themselves in unprecedented roles of defending American 
commercial investments in Cuban sugar plantations and 
Mexican railroads and mining.  With continued adherence to 
the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and 1904 Roosevelt Corollary, 
American policymakers found themselves relying upon 
effective cooperation and coordination between the military 
services to achieve national policy goals.   
In addition to protecting commercial investments, two 
diplomatic crises in Venezuela and a revolution in Mexico 
led to strategic considerations involving the Joint Board 
as well.  The British attempt in 1895 to claim land from 
Venezuela, as well as the Anglo-German naval blockade seven 
years later, fueled perceptions among American leaders that 
European nations sought to intervene politically from the 
across the Atlantic Ocean.  In the end, the Joint Board 
helped civilian policymakers chose Cuba as the lynchpin of 
American Caribbean defenses, and served as the policeman in 
the American Mediterranean.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
DEFENDING AND MANAGING THE ISTHMIAN PASS: 
 
THE PANAMA CANAL 
 
 
As the eyes of Joint Board members gazed toward the 
Caribbean, they focused particular attention on the narrow 
isthmus separating North and South America.  Prior to the 
creation of the Board, European powers such as Great 
Britain, France, and Germany jockeyed to secure 
construction rights to a short, safe water route between 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.  As for the United States, 
continued adherence to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, combined 
with a series of bilateral treaties beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century, ensured a principal position in any 
diplomatic discussions concerning Central American canal 
construction.  By 1903, as U.S. diplomats secured authority 
to construct a waterway across Panama, determining how best 
to defend and manage this new isthmian pass from foreign 
powers became a primary consideration for the admirals and 
generals of the Joint Board. 
Like in the Caribbean and Cuba, the Monroe Doctrine of 
1823 underpinned American diplomacy when it came to 
securing a Central American canal.  The United States 
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viewed any European attempts to intervene and control the 
affairs of Latin American nations throughout the Western 
Hemisphere as an inherent threat to U.S. national security.  
Yet as a relatively weak military power, diplomacy served 
for the next twenty five years as the only viable 
instrument for addressing security concerns in the 
Caribbean and Central America.   
The first U.S. foreign policy advance toward securing 
a voice in the management of what became the Panama Canal 
began a quarter of a century after pronouncement of the 
Monroe Doctrine.  Signed by the United States and Great 
Britain on 19 April 1850, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
stipulated that neither nation would exclusively control 
any trans-oceanic canal built in the region.  The treaty 
marked a clear diplomatic victory for the United States.  
Signing the agreement affirmed the Monroe Doctrine, an 
action that recognized the importance of the United States 
as a Western Hemisphere power.  By signing the accord Great 
Britain, at that point possessor of the most far-reaching 
maritime empire, assured that any future diplomatic 
considerations for a Latin American canal would include 
U.S. participation.  The treaty provisions and the 
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resulting diplomatic environment remained in effect for 
close to fifty years.1     
By the turn of the century, the diplomatic climate 
changed as the official U.S. position regarding isthmian 
passage possession expanded.  As the commercial and 
strategic value of a canal became clear, Washington 
demanded exclusive rights to owning and controlling any 
future waterway.  In February 1900 U.S. Secretary of State 
John Hay approached British Foreign Minister Sir Julian 
Pauncefote with the first of two treaties outlining new 
stipulations regarding any future canal.  Commonly known as 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty I, it called for the United States to 
have exclusive jurisdiction over any future isthmian pass.  
While popularly supported in principle, the final treaty in 
fact met strong political opposition in the U.S. Senate, 
whose members refused to ratify the treaty because it did 
not contain provisions allowing the U.S. to fortify the 
canal.  The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty restrictions – and 
unwanted British involvement in any future canal 
construction – remained.2
Such diplomatic setbacks proved short-lived.  By 
November 1901, the United States and Great Britain returned 
to the negotiation table to discuss new terms.  Struggling 
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in South Africa with the Boer War and facing the prospect 
of a major Russian advance into Asia, British diplomats 
gradually agreed to the proposals American diplomats had 
outlined in the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty talks.  The 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty II nullified provisions of the long-
standing Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and guaranteed all canal 
protection and traffic rights to the United States.  A 
product of British diplomatic necessity, Hay-Pauncefote 
Treaty II represented “the conscious British recognition of 
the eventual United States supremacy in the Western 
Hemisphere.”3  By the end of 1901, the United States had 
achieved recognition as the primary administrator of any 
Latin American isthmian pass.          
With the issue of sole jurisdiction over canal 
administration settled, attention next turned to the 
question of where to locate a future canal.  An 1899 
Isthmian Canal Commission appointed by President William 
McKinley set the parameters of the discussion, deliberated 
between sites in Nicaragua and Panama, and in the end 
recommended in its 16 November 1901 final report that 
Nicaragua, rather than Panama, provided the best site.  The 
Commission concluded that while a Nicaraguan canal cost 
more than a Panamanian canal, the former had fewer 
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entangling treaty stipulations with other neighboring 
nations, and avoided potential diplomatic dealings with 
Colombia.4  By early 1902 a sharp White House-Senate debate 
added to the discussions.  Beginning 29 March and 
continuing for nineteen days, Democrats in the Senate 
pushed for a Nicaraguan route while their Republican 
opponents in the minority called for a Panamanian 
passageway.  Ultimately the Panama position prevailed as 
evidence surfaced in June of recent heavy volcanic activity 
along the proposed Nicaraguan route.  In the end, President 
Theodore Roosevelt signed into law the Spooner Act on 28 
June 1902.  The legislation authorized the President to 
spend forty million dollars to purchase the French property 
rights in the area, negotiate with Colombia, and build a 
canal in Panama.5   
Civil war in neighboring Colombia also added a sense 
of urgency to the deliberation.  Torn by such internal 
strife, Colombia found itself in a precarious bargaining 
position.  U.S. policymakers recognized this weakened state 
and capitalized quickly on the opportunity.  The Colombian 
government appealed on 11 September 1902 to U.S. officials 
to mediate a settlement of its civil war. Eight days later 
the United States seized control of the Panama Railroad.  
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The American-dominated talks culminated with the Hay-Herrán 
Treaty signed 22 January 1903 and later ratified by the 
Senate on 17 March 1903.  Agreement terms stipulated 
Colombia authorized the French Compagnie Nouvelle to sell 
all rights and concessions to the United States.  Bogotá 
also conceded to Washington exclusive construction and 
protection rights for a canal and an up to fifteen-mile 
wide canal zone.  In addition, Hay-Herrán granted a one 
hundred year grant which could be renewed unilaterally by 
the United States, and authorized the United States “in 
cases of unforeseen or imminent danger” to unilaterally 
intervene in Colombian affairs in the name of canal 
defense.  Not surprisingly, the treaty attracted vehement 
opposition among Colombian officials.6
With title in hand, the United States sought to 
further strengthen its diplomatic position.  On 6 November 
1903 the United States government recognized Panamanian 
independence.  Twelve days later the United States made the 
recognition official by signing the Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
Treaty.  In addition to recognizing Panamanian 
independence, the treaty affirmed U.S. canal building 
rights in the region.7  Through skilled and opportunistic 
diplomacy, the United States now held a dominant position 
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for constructing an isthmian waterway in newly-founded 
Panama.    
While American civilian authorities perhaps felt 
comforted with their diplomatic successes, military 
strategists back in the United States acted with urgency.  
Together high-ranking officers from both services planned 
possible military contingencies for the region.  Five weeks 
after signing the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, the Joint Board 
recommended a military response should war erupt between 
Panama and Colombia.  Writing to both civilian service 
secretaries in his capacity as Presiding Officer, Admiral 
George Dewey advised that in the event of war the United 
States should occupy – by force if necessary – the railroad 
and canal, as well as mining storage facilities in the 
Yavisa region of Panama.  Dewey closed his report by 
stating that the Board recommended immediate occupation of 
Yavisa.8  While war never materialized, the Joint Board 
contingency planning demonstrated a consultative body 
attuned to the immediate diplomatic conditions facing its 
civilian superiors.   
Such immediate action, however, never translated into 
long-term practice.  Surprisingly, not until six months 
later did the first hint of substantive war planning 
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concerning Latin America appear.  A return to action 
occurred during the second week of June 1904, when the 
Joint Board advised that both the Army General Staff and 
Navy General Board should begin study how the United States 
could most effectively “intervene in the affairs of an 
independent country in the West Indies or on the mainland 
of Central or South America” should it become necessary 
under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine.9
For almost the next two years the admirals and 
generals remained quiet regarding the Panama Canal.  
Finally, in April 1906, Dewey reported to Secretary of War 
William H. Taft and Secretary of the Navy Charles J. 
Bonaparte that the Joint Board resolved that both ends of 
the Panama Canal should be fortified.10  As the canal neared 
completion, defending the Panama Canal became a primary 
concern for both civilian policymakers and military 
strategists. 
For the next four years how to protect the isthmian 
pass remained unsettled.  Resolution arrived in May 1910 
when the Joint Board considered and approved the sea coast 
armament recommendations as outlined by the Panama 
Fortification Board.  Created in October 1909, the Panama 
Fortification Board consisted of six Army officers and two 
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Navy officers appointed by their respective civilian 
service secretaries.  Major General Leonard Wood, Army 
Chief of Staff, presided over the Board.  All the remaining 
military officers who served on the Panama Fortification 
Board, with the exception of Brigadier General W.H. Bixby, 
also served concurrently on the Joint Board.11   
Reporting their findings directly to Secretary of War 
Jacob M. Dickinson, the Army and Navy members of the 
Fortification Board found in April 1910 that both sides of 
the canal contained “comparatively strong natural 
positions. . .for defense against land operations of an 
enemy force.”  The Board recommended that the War 
Department garrison twelve coast artillery companies, four 
infantry regiments, one field artillery battalion, as well 
as one cavalry squadron as peacetime Canal Zone sea coast 
armament defenses, with wartime reinforcements dispatched 
according to expected enemy deployments.  It estimated the 
peacetime cost of such a garrison would be $14 million a 
year.12
Ultimately military leaders found the combination of 
nature, coastal fortifications, and Army troops an 
incomplete defense in case of an enemy invasion from the 
west.  According to the Committee on Land Defenses, a 
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subcommittee of the Panama Fortification Board, a large 
enemy force could land successfully on either the Atlantic 
or Pacific sides of the Canal Zone, but that topographical 
conditions would make operations after such an amphibious 
landing extremely difficult on the Atlantic side.  The most 
important conditions were the heavy rainfall and jungle 
terrain, which together made an enemy assault on that side 
“extremely unfavorable.”  Yet given the right conditions, 
the Committee concluded that the area around the Pacific 
end of the canal could be penetrated by an enemy amphibious 
force and the opening of the canal seized.13        
While the vulnerability of the Panama Canal to enemy 
attack was recognized, nothing was done to improve defenses 
for over two years.  Not until March 1913 did Army leaders 
again address the problem of defending the canal.  
According to a report by the Army War College, the size of 
the garrison stationed in Panama for defense of the canal 
should be determined by calculating the number of troops 
needed “to resist attack of a force which could be landed 
from a fleet such as one of the great powers might be 
expected to have at sea.”  The Joint Board reacted to this 
report by suggesting blandly that it was “most desirable” 
to conduct joint army-navy maneuvers “in order that, if 
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they exist, and defects in the scheme of fortification and 
defense of the Isthmus may be rectified with the least 
delay.”14   
Two months later the Joint Board identified Japan as 
the great power referred to in veiled terms by the Army War 
College Division.  The interservice consultative staff, 
however, never recommended any substantive change in 
defensive measures to protect the canal from a Japanese 
attack.  According to the 5 May 1913 meeting minutes, the 
admirals and generals referred to “the possibility of a 
Japanese attack on the Western termini of the Panama Canal, 
and possible means of meeting such an attack,” but again 
recommended no measures to meet such a threat.15  Such 
concern over the Japanese certainly made sense, considering 
the resounding 1905 Japanese naval defeat of the Russian 
navy at Tsushima and the war scare stemming from the 1906 
San Francisco School Board policy segregating Japanese and 
Chinese children in public schools.16  Yet in the end the 
Joint Board as a forum failed to resolve the shortcomings 
of the Panama Canal defenses.        
A major source of this failure may stem in fact simply 
from neglect.  In rare amended minutes, it is clear that 
both the admirals and generals in the Joint Board concerned 
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themselves more with questions on who should govern the 
Panama Canal Zone, as well as how it should be governed.  
During the 9 October 1913 meeting, Admiral Dewey commented 
the law stated “that war being imminent, the Government 
should be in the hands of the Army.”  Brigadier General 
William Crozier responded “the President…goes farther, in 
that it is always to be under the Army.”  Captain H.S. 
Knapp, Joint Board recorder, cited in his notes the subject 
was “discussed at length a general consensus of opinion 
seemed to be that the government should always be a 
military one.”  The discussion ended with Admiral Dewey 
insisting simply there be “no civilian control.”17  
The Joint Board extended its discussions into the 
following month before reaching consensus.  During this 
time the General Board recommended a single U.S. military 
service administer all government matters within the Canal 
Zone.  The Governor would be an Army officer charged 
directly with command of troops and fortifications.  The 
Director of Operations and Maintenance of the Canal, the 
second-highest government official behind the Governor, 
however, would be a Navy officer responsible for all Navy-
related personnel and materiel in the Zone.  Two assistants 
under the command of the Director of Operations and 
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Maintenance – either an officer from the Army Engineering 
Corps or Navy Civil Engineering Corps – would control the 
Panama Canal waterway, while the other officer headed the 
railway.  When Captain Knapp read the 1 November 1913 
endorsement to the Joint Board as a whole, Admiral Dewey 
referred the matter to a subcommittee composed of Knapp and 
Brigadier General W.W. Wotherspoon.18       
This “all-military” option encountered stiff civilian 
opposition.  According to Colonel George W. Goethals, 
Chairman of the Isthmian Canal Commission, Congress as a 
whole believed commercial interests dictated the need for 
an isthmian canal long before any demands of military 
strategy.  Senators and representatives thus advocated 
strongly against a pure military jurisdiction in the Canal 
Zone.  Goethals stated that the Commission believed “that 
the President [should] not [be] limited in his selection to 
either of the military branches of the service, but that he 
could select a civilian” to serve as chief administrator 
for the Canal Zone.19              
Debate over managing the isthmian pass continued into 
the following year.  By January 1914 the Joint Board still 
did not reach a collective recommendation.  The 
Wotherspoon-Knapp subcommittee had yet to submit its final 
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report.  Nevertheless, influential generals continued to 
voice their opinions outside of the Joint Board.  The Army 
War College Division became one forum of such Army 
response.  The Army agreed with the Navy insofar as Canal 
administration and operations were primarily military 
affairs that required military consideration alone.  The 
Army War College President concluded the Army Corps of 
Engineers should maintain and operate the Canal.  Should 
the Governor leave, die, or be disabled, the next highest 
Army officer should assume the functions of the office.  
Under the Army plan, the Navy would be relegated to a 
lesser supporting role.20
Army Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood stated his 
opinion in that the Panama Canal “partakes of the character 
of a well-guarded and secure defile connecting our Atlantic 
seacoast and interests in the Caribbean Sea with our 
Pacific seacoast and possessions in the Pacific Ocean.”21  
The Panama Canal embodied a military necessity as much as a 
commerce maritime highway.  Defending and managing the 
whole commercial American Empire required strongly 
protecting and militarily administering one of its most 
vital parts – the isthmian pass.    
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As the debate over civilian versus military management 
of Panama drug on, the shadow of warring Europe began to 
influence discussions.  In June 1914 the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee opened hearings on how the U.S. should 
react to the possibility of a German-run Nicaraguan Canal.  
Nicaraguan ambassador General Emiliano Chamorro testified 
that Germany was willing to pay more than three million 
dollars for a canal route.  On 5 August 1914, as World War 
I began in Europe, U.S. and Nicaraguan diplomats signed the 
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.  Under its provisions, Nicaragua 
allowed the United States a ninety-nine year period in 
which to establish a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, 
thus negating any possible rival waterway to the Panama 
Canal.22   
The last notable Joint Board action regarding the 
Panama Canal concerned an Atlantic submarine base.  In late 
July 1916, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels informed 
the Joint Board that the Navy’s General Board had 
recommended that a submarine base be stationed in the 
Panama Canal Zone.  The Navy consultative body called for a 
primary submarine base with a twenty-boat capacity on the 
Atlantic side at Coco Solo Point, and an auxiliary base 
with a ten-boat capacity on the Pacific side at Balboa 
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Harbor.23  The Joint Board concurred with the naval 
position, recognizing submarines as “an essential element 
of the defense of the Canal Zone, including the Canal 
itself.” The admirals and generals together found 
submarines a formidable obstacle necessary in the face of 
any future enemy amphibious assaults.  By 1917 civilian 
policymakers heeded the military advice and constructed a 
peninsular submarine base at the recommended site.24           
Contingency planning following the Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
Treaty suggested a highly-responsive Joint Board, a 
consultative body attuned to the diplomatic environment 
facing American diplomats.  Almost immediately, the 
admirals and generals provided their civilian superiors 
with a military option should war occur between Colombia 
and the newly-independent Panama.  Yet in the end, such war 
planning initiative gave way to a period of neglect.  A 
dismal state of affairs followed, and proved symptomatic of 
future Joint Board actions.     
In the final analysis, the Joint Board failed to agree 
on concrete plans on how to manage and defend the Panama 
Canal Zone.  As Secretaries of State John M. Clayton, John 
Hay, and William Jennings Bryan successfully garnered 
diplomatic rights for the United States to construct a 
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waterway across Latin America, the admirals and generals 
fumbled the two most basic tasks assigned to them.  When it 
came to determining how best to defend the Panama Canal 
from foreign powers, the Board tabled discussion on the 
subject for four years.  Not until the spring of 1910, and 
the final report of the Panama Fortification Board manned 
by its own members, did the Joint Board begin serious 
discussion on Panama Canal Zone defenses.  Even then, 
however, the interservice consultative body failed to shed 
light on the susceptibility of the natural and artificial 
defenses to foreign amphibious assault until two and a half 
years later.  Luckily for the Joint Board, no enemy 
launched an attack on the Panama Canal during World War I, 
and a Japanese challenge to U.S. interests in the eastern 
Pacific never translated into a real threat.    
The Board failed equally in dealing with management of 
the Canal Zone.  Strict adherence to a military-only Canal 
Zone government antagonized Congress.  Civil-military 
relations – and Joint Board inaction on the subject – 
reached a point where the Army War College President and 
Army Chief of Staff responded to civilian criticism outside 
the interservice forum.  With such strained civil-military 
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relations and narrowed service interests we now turn 
westward and across the Pacific. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
“BROKEN DOWN OLD MEN:” 
 
THE PACIFIC AND THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 
 Following victory in the 1898 Spanish–American War and 
1902 Philippine War, American admirals and generals found 
themselves in an unprecedented position as protectors of a 
new and far-reaching Pacific empire.  U.S. possessions 
stretched further westward to include Hawaii, Guam, and the 
Philippines.1  Such responsibilities, like those found at 
home, in the Caribbean, as well as the Panama Canal, 
demanded U.S. military services work together.   
 Examination of official records reveals Joint Board 
admirals and generals from 1903 until World War I spent 
most of their meetings struggling to find a unified Pacific 
strategy.  Both Army and Navy officers found these meetings 
opportune times to extend service disagreements, especially 
over where to locate the main Philippine naval station.  
While such interservice bickering incurred a personal 
admonishment from two different presidents, the military 
authorities stubbornly persisted to the point of making a 
failed attempt to expand on their own their original 
consultative mandate.  In the end, catering to service 
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interests, as well as endeavoring to expand its role beyond 
simply military advising, cost the Joint Board its overall 
influence by straining relations beyond repair with the 
President. 
 American interest in the Pacific dated well before the 
creation of the Joint Board.  American merchants recognized 
the economic potential of Asian commercial markets as early 
as the 1780s.  By the mid-nineteenth century, civilian 
decision-makers had begun to employ the U.S. Navy not only 
to protect American merchant trading in the area, but to 
expand commercial opportunities in the region.2   
The shift from sail to steam power in the middle and 
late nineteenth century gave rise to the need for coaling 
stations along Pacific trade routes if the Navy was to 
provide adequate protection for America’s expanding 
commerce in the region.  Naval officers often served in 
diplomatic roles, most notably in China and with Commodore 
Matthew C. Perry’s “opening” of Japan in 1854.  The United 
States government leased land for a coaling depot from the 
Japanese at Yokohama in 1864.  In 1878 the U.S. acquired 
Pago Pago in Samoa, and in the Pearl Harbor treaty of 1887 
the United States obtained exclusive base rights at 
Honolulu.3  The Open Door Notes from 1899 to 1900 further 
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increased an American commercial commitment in the Far East 
by arguing for equal access for all nations to Chinese 
markets. 
 By the twentieth century the United States had 
invested heavily in the Pacific.  The 1899 Paris Peace 
Treaty ending the Spanish-American War granted the 
Philippine Islands and Guam to the United States.  
Immediately the Pacific archipelago garnered particular 
attention, while Guam received lesser concentration.4  
Secretary of the Navy William Henry Moody commented that 
American occupation of the Philippines would create order, 
rule of law, respect for individual rights, education, 
self-government, civilization, and “everything which makes 
life worth living to an American.”5  Such American moral 
resolve quickly translated into military action that 
involved the Army.  The President ordered the U.S. 8th Army 
Corps to capture Manila from the Spanish.  Later, from 1899 
to 1902, American military forces pacified the Philippines 
while Manila served as the principal site for Army 
headquarters on the island.6     
 An inlet thirty-seven miles northwest of Manila Bay, 
in contrast, found favor with Admiral George Dewey, popular 
war hero known for his U.S. Asiatic Squadron victory at the 
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Battle of Manila Bay and Navy General Board President 
beginning in 1900.  The value of the narrow ingress at 
Subic Bay∗ for possible fleet protection in case of enemy 
naval attack proved appealing.  As a result, fortification 
construction began at Olongapo at the edge of the bay 
following the Philippine War.7  By June 1903 – a month 
before the creation of the Joint Board – Dewey proclaimed 
“who holds Subig Bay holds Manila; who holds Manila holds 
Luzon; and who holds Luzon holds the Philippines.”8  With 
Dewey in favor of Subig Bay, the location of a Philippine 
naval station as the Navy’s position had been settled upon 
prior to the creation of the Joint Board. 
 The Navy’s focus on Subig Bay became quite clear 
within the first few Joint Board meetings.  The Board 
considered its defense for almost three weeks in December 
1903, ultimately recommending the civilian service 
secretaries seek from Congress immediate appropriations for 
its fortification.9  The Admiral of the Navy translated his 
maxim into reality, taking full advantage of his capacity 
as Senior Member of the Joint Board to support 
                                                 
∗ U.S. military strategists commonly spelled Subic Bay as 
“Subig Bay” during this time.  The author will use the 
second spelling throughout the rest of this work. 
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congressional appropriations for site defense.  Dewey wrote 
memoranda to both Secretaries Moody and Root urging Subig 
Bay as the site for a large Philippine naval station.  
Dewey called for “heavier ordnance, siege guns, mortars, 
mines, and vessels” at Subig Bay as increased defensive 
measures.  Failing to adequately fortify the area, Dewey 
warned, could lead to disastrous consequences for the 
nation.10
 In light of these personal recommendations by the 
Admiral, Army authorities began to use the Joint Board as a 
forum for expressing their concerns about defending Subig 
Bay.  In a memorandum dated 26 May 1904 to both civilian 
service secretaries, Dewey advocated that all available 
appropriations concerning the Philippines should be spent 
at Subig Bay.11  The Army Chief of Staff, in contrast, 
emphasized greater attention should be paid to Manila Bay.  
Drawing from the recommendations of his Assistant Chief of 
Staff for adequate occupational defenses, Lieutenant 
General Adna R. Chaffee advised the value of Manila Bay 
defenses be proportional to the value attached to Subig Bay 
by the Navy.12
Such a division occurred at the most inopportune time 
diplomatically.  Over the next two years, beginning with 
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the crushing Japanese naval victory over the Russians at 
Tsushima in 1905 and continuing with a 1906 San Francisco 
School Board referendum that segregated Chinese and 
Japanese in public schools, relations between the United 
States and Japan strained to the point where many Americans 
leaders perceived war as imminent.13  Japan now became a 
newfound source of strategic concern for the United States.  
A rising naval power, compounded with its close 
geographical proximity to the Philippines, affirmed the 
fear of U.S. military authorities that “the threat to the 
Philippines was no longer from a European power.”14   
Yet even given the ominous diplomatic climate facing 
the nation, Admiral Dewey remained undeterred in his push 
for a Subig Bay naval base.  The senior member of the Joint 
Board turned to individual connections for support.  On 26 
October 1906 Admiral Dewey wrote a lengthy letter to Rear 
Admiral Willard H. Brownson, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic 
Fleet.  In the letter he confided to Brownson that  
upon arriving at Manila (Cavite) you will encounter 
the Olongapo-Cavite question, to which [Admiral Henry 
C.] Taylor and I, the General Board, the War College, 
and all your predecessors as Commander-in-Chief 
[Asiatic Fleet], have given so much thought, and in 
which all have emphatically declared in favor of 
Olongapo as being, both from strategical and practical 
reasons, infinitely superior to Cavite as the 
situation for our naval base in the East.  You will 
 94
find in Manila a strong army sentiment, and civil 
sentiment as well, decidedly opposed to the Olongapo 
idea and enthusiastically in favor of retaining Cavite 
as it now is; and of all the advocates of this plan, 
General Wood, usually so clear-headed upon most 
matters, is the most ardent.  He and his followers 
reason that Manila is the Philippines and can only be 
protected by fortifications at Corregidor and a fleet 
in Manila Bay.  Such fallacious reasoning hardly needs 
controversion.  You will see that there is much to be 
done at Olongapo, and I hope [you] will frequently 
give me your ideas upon the subject and your 
criticisms of any existing plans for its development.  
In this respect you can be of great service to us and 
I hope you will not hesitate to express your 
opinions.15
 
For Dewey, the Army generally and Major General Leonard 
Wood particularly continued as the largest obstacles.  The 
letters’ content illustrated the fact that service 
interests outweighed the pursuit of harmonious interservice 
relations.  In addition, Admiral Dewey never at any point 
in his correspondence answered the criticisms of Subig Bay 
voiced by his army opponents.  More than any other 
institution deciding American military strategy, Admiral 
Dewey considered the Navy’s sister service an unacceptable 
hindrance toward a Subig Bay stronghold.      
U.S.-Japanese tensions never resulted in open 
hostilities until Pearl Harbor and World War II (1941 – 
1945).  These earlier events, however, exposed President 
Theodore Roosevelt to Joint Board indecisiveness when it 
 95
came to a collaborative military strategy in the Pacific.  
Roosevelt ordered that until the Joint Board concluded 
decisively whether to base U.S. defenses at Manila or Subig 
Bay, fortification construction at Subig Bay would be 
suspended.16  
The presidential directive only strengthened Army 
resolve on the Philippine naval station location issue.  
Army Chief of Staff Major General J. Franklin Bell employed 
arguments by Major General Wood, the general on site at 
Manila and charged with commanding the Philippines 
Division, to justify his Manila Bay position.17  During 
November 1907 Wood cabled his superiors in Washington that 
Subig Bay was “entirely impracticable with means on hand 
here or liable to be on hand” insofar as it was costly to 
man and “most vulnerable to land attack on at least three 
main lines.”18  The General stressed the “impracticality. . 
.with means at our disposal, or likely to be at our 
disposal,” demonstrating an analysis predicated on a keen 
awareness of congressional funding restraints.   
Wood continued to hold the same line of argumentation 
into December.  In a correspondence with the Adjutant 
General later read by Bell, Wood argued that between eighty 
and one hundred twenty-five thousand troops would be needed 
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to defend Subig Bay adequately.  Manila Bay, concluded 
Wood, would be “cheaper, easier, more secure, and of 
infinitely more military and political importance than 
Subig Bay.”19
The words of the commanding general in the Philippines 
quickly found an influential voice on the Joint Board.  At 
the 29 January 1908 meeting, General Bell exclaimed before 
the whole Board that “no matter how much more further study 
may be put upon the subject. . .the conditions surrounding 
Subig Bay are such that no land fortifications of any kind 
whatever can be erected covering the bay which will enable 
to Army to hold it against a serious land attack.”  The 
Army Chief of Staff further concluded that fortification 
appropriations expected from Congress would not suffice.20  
Bell, like Wood, emphasized a lack of legislative 
appropriations as well as the susceptibility of Subig Bay 
to land attack.  More importantly, however, this incident 
marked the first time the Army Chief of Staff openly 
questioned to the Board the Army’s ability to protect Subig 
Bay from enemy invasion.  The burden of defense now shifted 
heavily toward the Navy and its fleet. 
Naval members opposed strongly any prospect of 
consolidating the political administration and military 
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protection of the Philippines at Manila.  For one, the wide 
ingress to Manila Bay made American forces susceptible to 
enemy fleet attack.  Basing the fleet at Manila also 
required an American wartime fleet travel a further 
distance to engage the enemy forces at open sea.  In 
addition, should all military affairs be concentrated at 
Manila, enemy ships could simply stifle the whole island 
through a blockade. 
By February 1908 informal discussion guided the 
formation of military strategy.  The Army shifted its focus 
on the Philippine fortification issue by speaking directly 
with the President.  General Bell surprised President 
Roosevelt on the seventh by stating that inadequacies 
existed in all Pacific seacoast defenses, and that the 
protection of the American western coastline now required a 
powerful fleet.21  The Joint Board meeting on the eighteenth 
found its naval members seeking to gain from the change of 
events.  Naval members presented recommendations for an 
even larger fleet, one great enough for a two-ocean navy.  
The admirals closed their argument by arguing that 
“securing the command of the sea” assured strong coast 
defense and protection of the homeland.22  
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President Roosevelt reacted firmly to these events.  
Getting immediately to the point, the President chided the 
Joint Board in a memorandum to Secretary of William H. 
Taft. 
I call the attention of the Joint Board to the grave 
harm done by the army and navy by such vacillation and 
one-sided consideration as has been shown in the 
treatment by the army and navy experts of the 
Philippine problem; that is, of the question whether 
Manila Bay or Subig Bay should be fortified.23
 
Roosevelt demanded answers.  He asked “what circumstances 
occurred to bring about not merely the change in, but the 
absolute reversal of” the Joint Board on the subject?  The 
President closed by stating it was “evident that there is 
some defect in [the Joint Board’s] method [of operation] 
which ought to be removed.”24
 The presidential admonishment fell on deaf ears.  In 
duplicate memoranda dated 5 March 1908 addressed to 
Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf and Secretary of 
War Taft, Admiral Dewey responded to the presidential 
scolding by simply justifying past Joint Board actions.  
According to Dewey, when it came to defending the 
Philippines the Navy “acted alone from 1900 until December 
1903,” at which point the creation of the Joint Board 
allowed for the first time a joint committee to officially 
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submit a report calling for Subig Bay as the primary 
location for the naval base.25
 Dewey went on to argue lessons learned from the 
overwhelming Japanese naval victories during the Russo-
Japanese War (1904 – 1905) fundamentally challenged 
traditional U.S. Pacific military strategy as well.  The 
Japanese attack on Port Arthur on 8-9 February 1904 and the 
later naval battle at Tsushima illustrated the advantage of 
heavy artillery.26  The Joint Board Senior Member stated 
that until that point military planners never fully 
appreciated the value of using heavy ordnance.  He assured 
his civilian superiors, however, that by 1906 the Joint 
Board used heavy weapons as an index for selecting and 
constructing naval stations.27  Finally, diplomacy factored 
into American strategic calculus to that point.  Dewey 
argued the war altered U.S.-Japanese relations “from that 
of marked friendship to one which indicated possible open 
hostility.”28
 The Dewey memoranda suggested that up to that point 
flawed Joint Board recommendations stemmed simply from 
never fully appreciated stronger guns and strained 
relations.  Yet Dewey failed to address additional points 
that are of strategic interest.  For one, Dewey did not 
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inform his civilian authorities that the Army and Navy 
members of the Joint Board never unanimously backed the 
fortification of Subig Bay.  Recall Dewey, as the Joint 
Board’s most senior member, had access to unparalleled 
advising channels with civilian service secretaries through 
official Joint Board correspondence.  With such an ad hoc 
innovation in place, the Admiral had ample opportunities to 
conceal any hints of disunity between the admirals and 
generals.   
 Second, the memoranda conveyed no idea that the Navy 
had shifted its emphasize on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, as the 
primary Pacific defensive position by 1908-1909.  In 
February 1908 Dewey posited Pearl Harbor as “the most 
important position for a naval base,” maintaining that its 
capture would give the enemy a “position from which to 
launch attacks upon our Pacific Coast States and territory, 
and to control the Pacific exit of the Panama Canal.”29  
Pearl Harbor and Hawaii, not Subig Bay and the Philippines, 
served as the epicenter of U.S. Pacific military strategy.   
Reading the text also yields no appreciation of the 
expense of the heavy guns needed for adequate defense.  
Admiral Dewey never clarified how costly such defensive 
measures were, nor how provisions could restrict military 
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authorities to fortify only one of the two bays.  Tight 
purse strings translated into tough choices for the Joint 
Board.  In the end, the Dewey memoranda wrongly suggested 
the slow application of newly-learned strategic lessons and 
a dynamic diplomatic environment alone divided Joint Board 
opinion. 
Even while recognizing the changed strategic landscape 
in the Pacific, that naval members of the Board still 
pressed the case for Subig Bay into autumn 1909.  Rear 
Admiral Royal R. Ingersoll and Captain S.A. Staunton pushed 
for the northernmost inlet.  Both Joint Board members 
reported stationing forces at Manila would cost too much.  
In addition, docking the fleet at Manila Bay would subject 
it to “serious disablement by typhoons” and create a ripe 
strategic target for enemy invasion by making Manila the 
centralized political capital, commercial center, and main 
naval station.30
The Army members demonstrated the same stubbornness, 
still preferring Manila Bay.  Acting Governor General of 
the Philippines W. Cameron Forbes stated a preference for 
Corregidor, the largest island at the mouth of the bay.  
“We would be absolutely certain that [Manila] would be the 
last place to fall in time of war,” stated Forbes.  
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“Corregidor is in a sense impregnable.”31  Such logic found 
favor with the Joint Board generals.  General Wood, now a 
Joint Board member himself, recorded in his diary that 
after speaking with Generals Tasker H. Bliss and Arthur 
Murray, he agreed “we should center everything as far as 
possible on Corregidor.”32
By early November 1909 the Joint Board finally reached 
some degree of resolution insofar as Philippine defense 
responsibilities were concerned.  At the 8 November 
meeting, Army members collectively lodged a statement.  “In 
the event of war…the Army will be entirely relieved from 
the responsibility for defense of the Olongapo station 
attack from the land side.”  Not surprising given their 
main strategic focus had by now moved east to Hawaii, the 
naval members agreed.33  Such consensus, however, had 
profound repercussions for U.S. Pacific military strategy.  
Unlike in 1908, the burden of defending the Philippines now 
in fact shifted to a potential naval force.  Army forces 
now had to hold out until the fleet’s arrival. 
Such a strategy continued into the following decade.  
By 1913 U.S.-Japanese relations again reached a fevered 
pitch when the California state legislature passed land 
holding laws that discriminated against Orientals.34  During 
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the 15 May 1913 meeting, the Joint Board members voted 
unanimously to recommend moving the cruisers Saratoga, 
Cincinnati, Albany, Rainbow, and Helena immediately from 
the Yangtze River in China.  The Board justified the move 
to Manila both for fleet protection – Pearl Harbor and the 
main U.S. naval forces were over 4800 miles away – and as 
reinforcements for the Army forces located in the 
Philippines.35  General Wood commented on the recent 
strategic environment angrily in his diary. 
A situation absolutely inexcusable; the matter has 
been pointed out times without end and has been a 
subject of controversy for years.  The same situation 
existed to a lesser extent in 1907, and but a limited 
amount of capacity can explain the senseless 
separation of these shops and supplies from the place 
where they have to be rendezvoused in time of war.36
 
In addition to the suggestion of moving the ships, the 
admirals and generals decided they had authority “to 
initiate, as well as to act on subjects referred to it.”37  
Originally empowered solely to advise their civilian 
superiors, the eight military men together attempted to 
give the Joint Board an unprecedented independent authority 
to act.  This action taken by the Joint Board questioned 
its most basic functions.  The Board suggested divorcing 
its members from civilian control by expanding its 
consultative powers into operational authority. 
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By this time Woodrow Wilson occupied the White House.  
Wilson, together with high-ranking officials like Secretary 
of State William Jennings Bryan and Secretary of the Navy 
Josephus Daniels, believed strongly in civilian supremacy 
in military affairs.  Hints of such conviction first 
surfaced during a Cabinet meeting early in Wilson’s first 
term in office.  As Secretary of Agriculture David F. 
Houston recorded in his memoirs, during discussion of the 
recommended ship movements the Secretary of State “got red 
in the face and was very emphatic,” retorting angrily “army 
and navy officers could not be trusted to say what we 
should do or not do, till we actually got to war.”  Wilson 
responded that while the Joint Board “has presented the 
military aspect of the situation as it sees it and it may 
be right,” the President viewed the civilian Cabinet as a 
forum for “considering this matter with another light, on 
the diplomatic side” in order to determine policy.38
The attempt by the Joint Board to expand its authority 
ended any influence with the President.  On Saturday 17 May 
1913 Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels immediately went to 
the White House and informed President Wilson of new 
developments pertaining to the Joint Board.  Earlier that 
morning Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, a naval member of the 
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Joint Board, appealed to the Secretary to follow the 
Board’s advice concerning the deployment of ships.  Daniels 
rejected the military counsel.  According Daniels, shortly 
after Fiske’s departure a reporter from a large newspaper 
entered his office and “asked if I had approved the action 
of the Joint Board of taking all ships on the Pacific Coast 
and sending [them] to Hawaii or Manila.”  After having 
Daniels recount events, Wilson responded by stating that 
following his decision the Joint Board “had no right to be 
trying to force a different course” and concluded by 
warning Daniels that “if this should occur again, there 
will be no General or Joint Boards.  They will be 
abolished.”39
This presidential anger never really subsided, and 
from that point until 1919 the influence of the Joint Board 
declined.  In what would be one of his last memorandum as 
senior member of the Joint Board, Dewey affirmed to 
Secretary Daniels that effective May 1914 “no more meetings 
of the Joint Board were to be held” by verbal orders of the 
President.40   
By 1917 the Joint Board fell into bureaucratic 
neglect.  Even though officially both the War and Navy 
Secretaries submitted subjects for recommendation, unfilled 
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membership vacancies left the Joint Board unable to 
consider them in quick enough time.41  Age and duty also 
took its toll on the Board.  Admiral Dewey suffered a 
debilitating stroke.  Additionally, the land war in Europe 
garnered the time and attention of officers like Army Chief 
of Staff General Peyton C. March.   
In his diary General Wood appraised an instance of the 
Joint Board deciding U.S. military strategy in the Pacific.   
The situation brought about by broken down old men 
handling the matter is not only ridiculous but highly 
dangerous.  They are simply milling around without any 
definite policy concerning anything.42
 
A look at Joint Board minutes and files concerning the 
Pacific and the Philippines reveal roots of such a 
breakdown.  To be sure, Army-Navy debates over where to 
place the Philippine naval station had negative 
repercussions for the Joint Board during the presidencies 
of Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow 
Wilson.  The continued advocacy of naval members from 1903 
until 1909 – most strongly by Admiral George Dewey, as well 
as members like Admiral Royal Ingersoll and Captain Sidney 
A. Staunton – for Subig Bay, while Army members pushed for 
fortifying Manila Bay, angered the former Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy to the point of personally 
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admonishing the interservice body.  Yet Roosevelt did not 
permit such anger to blind him from their future 
recommendations. 
 What ultimately destroyed Joint Board influence was 
its failed attempt in 1914 to extend its original duties 
and responsibilities from consultative powers into 
operational authority.  Important superiors such as 
President Woodrow Wilson and Navy Secretary Daniels 
perceived the action as a bold stroke against their 
cherished ideal of civilian supremacy in military affairs.  
Consequently, the first permanent interservice consultative 
body had by World War I became a committee of inactivity.  
By 1919, the Joint Board decayed into a group of “broken 
down old men” who had lost their most valuable asset: the 
ear of their commander-in-chief.                       
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
“It is a fundamental principle,” wrote Acting 
Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt to Secretary of 
State Robert Lansing on 1 May 1919, “that the foreign 
policy of our government is in the hands of the State 
Department.  “It is also an accepted fact,” Roosevelt 
continued, “that the foreign policy of a government depends 
for its acceptance by other nations upon the naval and 
military force that is behind it.”1 In an effort to mend 
civil-military wounds between American policymakers and 
military strategists, the future president submitted with 
his memorandum an organizational chart prepared by the 
Naval War College.  Together the documents outlined a new 
“Joint Plan Making Body” composed of State Department, Army 
General Staff, as well as Navy General Board 
representatives.  Ultimately the plan never translated into 
practice.  The Secretary of State never acknowledged the 
memorandum, appearing never even to have opened it in the 
first place.2
Lansing’s inaction ironically proved symptomatic of 
the state of interservice cooperation and collaboration in 
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the United States from 1903 until 1919.  Prior to its 
creation in July 1903, the Joint Board continued earlier 
traditions of formulating military strategy through ad hoc 
innovations and recommendations made by consultative staffs 
within each respective service.  The successes of the 1847 
Veracruz assault and 1863 Vicksburg campaign illustrated 
that sometimes such informality worked.  As a consequence, 
amicable personal relations between the admirals and 
generals became institutional practice.   
Yet the Santiago campaign in Cuba during the 1898 
Spanish-American War introduced the need for a greater 
degree of institutional permanency in the formation of 
American military strategy, and exposed the fragility of a 
system based solely on strategizing impromptu.  As General 
William R. Shafter and Admiral William T. Sampson 
demonstrated in pursuing divergent courses of action for 
seizing the Cuban city, interservice acrimony stemmed from 
the very same level that had traditionally brought 
interservice harmony.  As predicating interservice 
cooperation solely on how well generals and admirals 
related with one another proved a risky venture by the turn 
of the twentieth century, the services created consultative 
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staffs such as the Navy General Board and Army General 
Staff within their own services.     
As the United States acquired new and far-reaching 
possessions following the Spanish-American War in 1898, 
civilian policymakers in Washington assigned American 
military forces to unprecedented roles.  Over a sixteen 
year period the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy found themselves 
formulating strategies together when it came to the 
protection of American shores through coast defense, the 
enforcement of the Caribbean in regional defense of 
American commercial investments, the defense and management 
of the Panama Canal, and the deliberation on the 
fundamentals of American military strategy in the Pacific.   
Consequently, the Joint Board’s initial structural 
design continued this interservice management.  With its 
creation, the Joint Board provided effective functions when 
it came to the general formation of American military 
strategy.  For over ten years, the Joint Board brought 
together highly professional senior military and naval 
officers.  The Navy Department’s Mills Building became home 
to unprecedented gatherings of Army General Staff officers 
and Navy General Board members who collaborated on 
recommending important military actions.  Thanks to the 
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reform efforts of Admiral Henry C. Taylor and Secretary of 
War Elihu Root, what had once been a personal process for 
their predecessors now achieved a high degree of 
institutional and – at least in theory - interservice 
permanency.   
During its early years the Joint Board also functioned 
well when it came to the minutiae of military affairs.  The 
admirals and generals reached consensus on matters dealing 
with the location of wireless telegraphy lines at 
Guantanamo naval station in Cuba.  Joint Board members also 
agreed consistently on the desire for military-led 
governments at U.S. insular possessions.  Recommendations 
for military management of installations designed for 
protection of the Panama Canal and Philippine naval 
stations at Manila and Subig Bays reflected an incredibly 
high degree of interservice accord.     
Yet despite such cooperative efforts, civilian 
policymakers never granted the Joint Board any decision-
making authority.  Consequently, when it came to the 
execution of American military strategy, the interservice 
agency had a far more tainted track record.  Protecting 
American shorelines from enemy attack proved a task beyond 
Joint Board advising channels.  When it came to determining 
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how best to protect these defensive areas, the admirals and 
generals instead found themselves deliberating outside the 
Joint Board.  Civilian policymakers listened with the same 
degree of attentiveness to coast defense recommendations 
put forth by smaller interservice agencies like the Fort 
Totten Torpedo Board and Joint Army and Navy Board on 
Aeronautic Cognizance similarly as to those advanced by the 
Joint Board.  In the end, all the Joint Board did was 
simply agree with the smaller bodies, and issue almost 
verbatim recommendations. 
In the final analysis, however, the fumbling of grand 
strategy issues in the period immediately prior to World 
War I tarnished the Board’s historical legacy most of all.  
While perhaps agreeing on the need for military management 
of insular governments, army and navy leaders disagreed 
vehemently over where to place specific insular naval 
stations.  The Pacific naval base controversy, where naval 
members including Joint Board president Admiral Dewey, 
pushed for Subig Bay while army members led by Major 
General Leonard Wood advocated strongly for fortifying 
Manila Bay, angered President Theodore Roosevelt to the 
point of personally admonishing the interservice group to 
make up its collective mind.  In the end, such interservice 
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acrimony contributed to the Joint Board’s decline in 
influence.  Yet Roosevelt did not allow such irritation 
with the Board to blind him to its value or to discount its 
future recommendations.  As a result the Joint Board, 
though initially off to a somewhat rocky start, survived 
and had the opportunity to serve later presidents. 
Instead of heeding the words of their commander-in-
chief, however, the admirals and generals ignored such past 
encounters and ultimately pushed civilian tolerance of the 
Joint Board too far. The failed attempt in 1914 by members 
of the Board to extend their original powers from 
consultative into operational authority sealed its decline. 
President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of the Navy Josephus 
Daniels – both noted for their distrust of the military – 
perceived such actions as moves against civilian supremacy 
in military affairs.  By World War I, the first attempt in 
American history at a permanent interservice consultative 
body, an institution that had once found favor in the White 
House, had lost its important presidential audience.  The 
challenge of coordinating rooks and bishops continued.   
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 Memorandum, Acting Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1919, cited in 
Ernest R. May, “The Development of Political-Military 
Consultation in the United States,” Political Science 
Quarterly 70 (June 1955): 167.   
 
2 Memorandum, Acting Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1919, as cited 
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original of Roosevelt’s letter in the State Department 
archives, the blueprint was stapled to it, closed, and, as 
far as I could tell, the staple had never been removed, the 
blueprint never unfolded.” 
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